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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
STEM CELL RESEARCH: WHO OWNS THE 
MEDICAL BREAKTHROUGHS? 
SEAN M. O’CONNOR* 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2004 election year provided many focus points for those 
interested in stem cell research and its potential outcomes. Stem cell 
research became a substantial, albeit secondary, point of difference in the 
presidential campaigns, gubernatorial races, and congressional contests 
across the country. In California it was the subject of Proposition 71,2 
which passed by a healthy margin. At the same time, stem cell research has 
become one of the lightning rod issues in larger national and local bioethics 
debates. Some oppose it as the unjustifiable destruction of (potential) 
human life, while others support it, under certain restrictions, as the most 
promising means to finally cure a host of vexing diseases with essentially 
the body’s own materials. 
Accordingly, there is a rapidly growing wealth of literature on the 
science and the ethics involved in stem cell research. Some of that 
literature, of course, is part of this Symposium issue of the New England 
Law Review. However, this article will not address the science and ethics of 
stem cell research—at least as far as those topics are normally addressed in 
the existing literature. Instead, this article argues that an even more 
contentious battle is looming on the horizon, with dire practical 
consequences: Namely, who will own the revolutionary medical 
breakthroughs that are supposed to emerge from this research? 
Along the way, this article will assume that stem cell research will 
progress in some fashion and that at least some of the purported benefits 
* Sean M. O’Connor is a professor of Intellectual Property, Biotechnology, Business 
and Securities Law at the University of Washington School of Law. He holds a J.D. 
from Stanford Law School and an M.A. in Philosophy from Arizona State University. 
 2. CAL. CONST., art. XXXV (as amended by Proposition 71 2004). 
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will materialize. But the central premise is that the pitch of the ownership 
battle will rise proportionally to the success rate of the research. Thus, the 
more we achieve the vaunted promises of stem cell research, the more a 
crisis will be precipitated over the ownership of its results. Further, because 
the research will most likely proceed under some combination of federal, 
state, local, non-profit and private for-profit funding sources, the ownership 
rights will be anything but clear. In this way, the ownership questions will 
mirror those currently faced every day by universities and their tech- 
transfer offices. Which funding sources were used in reaching certain 
patentable research inventions? Are there intellectual property (IP) 
ownership claims attached to these funding sources? If multiple claims 
exist, which one trumps the others? 
But in the end, regardless of the funding sources (and concomitant 
ownership claims), the public’s claim to reasonable access to any crucial 
life-saving medical breakthroughs that do arise from stem cell research 
may well force federal, state or local officials to circumvent the existing 
political opposition to compulsory licenses in the United States. The public 
pressure that led to the recent, highly controversial moves of some state and 
local governments to allow the importation of arguably cheaper 
prescription drugs from Canada for government employees will pale in 
comparison to the pressure that will be brought when the general public 
believes that it is being left out of revolutionary cures for cancer, diabetes, 
and Alzheimer’s disease based on the inability to pay exorbitant private 
sector prices for such treatments. 
This crisis, and its concomitant challenge to the social order and 
existing IP ownership structure, must be averted by taking pro-active 
measures now. In fact, some sorting and planning of ownership claims that 
correspond to funding sources can be effected today for new stem cell 
research initiatives. This initiative alone would go a long way to prevent 
the kind of post hoc ownership battles that are the most difficult to unwind. 
In addition, this article establishes that a few de facto compulsory license 
schemes already exist in the current IP environment. The availability of any 
of these avenues is conditioned on the need for governmental provision of 
the technology/products/services to serve a compelling public health 
interest that is of “vital importance” to the government. But, this article 
concludes that this may be exactly the right test of when the extraordinary 
step of a compulsory license should be taken. 
Part I of this article begins by parsing the funding sources and 
environment for stem cell research. Part II then lays out the pros and cons 
of using federal funds for such research. Part III argues that stem cell 
research will be a victim of its own success because the more successful it 
is, the more contested the ownership rights to, and distribution mechanisms 
of resultant therapies will become. Part III also uses the examples of two 
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recent similar controversies to speculate as to how the conflicts over 
ownership and use of stem cell therapies will play out. Finally, Part IV 
offers perspectives on the hyperbole and rhetoric surrounding recent life 
sciences IP ownership debates, and asserts that pro-active, thoughtful 
allocation of IP rights in advance could do much to mitigate the coming 
crisis of ownership. Further, Part IV argues that even absent such effective 
planning, the government does have a few de facto compulsory license 
tools at its disposal that can be acted on, provided there is a public health 
solution that can be deemed to be of vital importance to the government. 
I.  DO WE NEED PUBLIC FUNDING FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH? 
A. Background on the Connection Among Funding, Control, and 
Ownership of Patents Arising from Research Efforts. 
Many of the most vexing ownership questions that arise from research 
funding sources involve multiple funding sources. If a private company 
fully funds its own internal research, then there is a single funding source 
and ownership of any resulting patentable inventions is generally pretty 
clear: Title resides with the company. This is true because the employees 
who invented the subject matter of the patent either: (1) contractually 
assigned any ownership rights to patents arising from their research 
through an express provision in an employment agreement;3 (2) implicitly 
or indirectly assigned their ownership rights by agreeing to abide by 
employer policies, which often include IP assignment rules, at the time of 
hire; or (3) must assign any ownership rights to patents to their employer 
under common law case precedent in the event that there is no employment 
agreement or IP ownership agreement.4
 3. Such contracts are generally upheld so long as they do not violate specific state 
statutory restrictions on the extent to which employers may demand assignment of 
existing or later arising patentable inventions. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 102-03 (2d ed. 2000). For 
example, both Washington State and California prohibit employers from requiring 
employees to assign inventions that did not arise from activities using employer 
facilities or on “company time,” but rather only because they arose during the term of 
employment. Id. at 102; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.140 (West 2002); CAL. 
LABOR CODE § 2870 (West 2003). 
 4. This common law assignment occurs only where the employee is hired to invent. 
MERGES, supra note 3, at 102. Where the employee is not hired to invent, but still 
uses employer resources or time to invent, then the employee owns the patentable 
invention but must give the employer a non-exclusive “shop right” to practice the 
invention. Id. Where the employee is neither hired to invent, nor uses employer 
resources or time, then the employee retains all title to the patentable invention and 
the employer has no right or license to practice the invention. Id. 
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But the foregoing example demonstrates that even in what should be 
the most intuitive and straightforward case—a company’s internal research 
and development (R&D) process—the means for determining ownership of 
resultant IP are never simple. Thus private employers need to establish why 
they are entitled to the IP arising from the efforts of their employees, and 
they generally do so by explicit contractual arrangements, which head off 
disputes about the exact scope of employment and happenstance of the 
invention. In part, this derives from the mandate of U.S. patent law that the 
true individual inventor be named as the inventor on the patent 
application.5 Thus, even when an employee has pre-assigned ownership of 
inventions arising out of the scope of her employment to her employer, the 
patent application must still name her as the inventor.6 This is different 
from U.S. copyright law wherein employees’ creations—when the 
employee is hired to create—will generally be deemed a “work-for-hire,” 
and not only ownership but also authorship will reside with the employer.7 
In this manner, there can be “corporate authors”— corporations listed as 
the actual author of a work—but not corporate inventors—corporations 
listed as the actual inventors of a new device or method. But this 
mandatory traceable lineage to the individual inventor can lead to some 
confusion, real or otherwise, on the part of inventors as to their ownership 
of the final issued patent. 
Thus, in patent law the question of who funded the inventor’s efforts 
can have a profound impact on the question of who owns or controls the 
resultant patent. If we consider the development of patentable inventions 
outside of the privately funded and controlled labs, the picture becomes 
even murkier. Take a standard public university researcher and his lab: (1) 
the university may be using state funds and tuition dollars to pay for the 
basic lab and its upkeep; (2) the researcher may have received a grant from 
a federal agency to conduct specific research and/or  from a non-profit 
source for closely-related research; and (3) the lab and its staff may be 
conducting other related work under funding through a sponsored research 
agreement with a private corporation. Under scenario (1), and considering 
the customary claim to patentable inventions included in most academic 
appointments,8 any patentable inventions that the researcher invents in the 
course and scope of his employment with the university must be assigned 
to the university. But under situation (2), when the researcher receives a 
grant from a federal agency, the university will only get title to an 
 5. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(f), 256 (2000). 
 6. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 72 n.3 
(3d ed. 2004). 
 7. Copyright Ownership and Transfer Works Made for Hire, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000). 
 8. But, interestingly, not for copyrightable works. 
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invention funded, even just in part, by federal agencies, in the event that the 
university formally elects to take such title under the provisions of the 
Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980 
(Bayh-Dole Act).9 Alternatively, non-profit funding sources in situation (2) 
may require assignment of any IP arising from the research, or may require 
certain uses or limitations on what the university can do with the IP, even 
where the university retains title to it. Finally, under situation (3), private 
for-profit commercial firms rarely sponsor research without requiring 
assignment of any resultant IP, and further, generally institute strict 
confidentiality provisions on lab staff. 
Clearly these claims to and possible restrictions on the uses of IP 
generated by the lab can be in conflict. Many university tech-transfer 
offices have anecdotal—and of course anonymous—stories of patentable 
inventions that turned out to have been assigned to two or three different 
funding sources. Because these are often written, legally binding pre-
assignments of the patentable inventions arising from the same specific 
research, each claim is generally valid and enforceable, and yet impossible 
to fulfill. At this point, the tech-transfer office simply has to bring the 
affected parties to the table and hope that they will be able to reach a 
negotiated compromise. 
At the same time, patentable inventions arising from research even 
only partly funded by a federal agency trigger the right of the institution to 
elect to retain title.10 But where the institution fails to either disclose the 
patentable invention or elect to take title to it, then the funding agency has 
the right to take such title.11 Further, where the institution does elect to 
retain title, it may not then assign such title to another entity (except an 
entity established solely to manage that institution’s patent portfolio, such 
as an external tech-transfer office) without the approval of the government 
funding agency.12 Thus, where research is to be funded by both federal and 
private sources, the university will not be able to assign free and clear title 
to resultant IP in advance to the private funding source; at best, it can 
promise to work with the private funding source, once specific patentable 
inventions have arisen (and have been claimed by the university), to 
petition the federal funding agency to allow it to assign title to those 
specific inventions to the private entity. 
Given the challenges of multiple funding sources, especially 
involving federal agencies, why should research ever be undertaken with 
 9. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-27 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-
211). 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000). 
 11. Id. § 202(c)(1)-(2). 
 12. Id. § 202(c)(7). 
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multiple sources? The easy answer is the exigencies of particular research 
situations—all necessary funding may not be procurable from a single 
source. But the more interesting question is whether the kind of very costly 
facilities and staff necessary for stem cell research could be funded by a 
single source. Referring back to the easy IP ownership example given 
above, it would seem that private companies would be in the best situation 
to research and develop stem cell therapies without entangling themselves 
in multiple, and possibly conflicting, claims of IP ownership. 
So why are we worrying about funding and ownership? Why not just 
push private companies to undertake this research in-house and then allow 
them to reap the fruits of exclusive control of the therapies that result? At 
the same time, one might ask why this is in fact not the clear trend (even as 
there are some examples). Looking to earlier examples of private versus 
public initiatives in life sciences research, one might think that the race 
between Celera Genomics13 and the Human Genome Project14 to map the 
human genome would provide an excellent example of the capacity of 
private industry to take on even a broadly funded public initiative, and win. 
And yet, it seems that this was the exception that proves the rule. Or, 
alternately, this was only one very specific project, whereas stem cell 
research covers a host of different research projects. Will viable private 
sector entities step forward to undertake each and every one of these 
projects? Even if they did, would universities and non-profit research 
centers simply fold up their tents and stop doing such research themselves? 
Would we want them to? 
B. The Bush Order on Federal Funding of hPSC Research. 
Perhaps shedding some light on these questions was one of the ways 
that the issue of stem cell research turned up in the 2004 election year. The 
issue seemed to first appear during the presidential race, in which both 
candidates claimed to be generally in favor of it, even as John Kerry and 
the Democrats argued that the Bush Administration had actually restricted 
stem cell research. Not surprisingly, the reality was a bit more complicated. 
It is unclear whether any federal funding of research leading up to formal 
work with stem cells occurred, but by the time human pluripotent stem 
cells (hPSCs) were isolated and successfully cultured in 1998 by scientists 
at the University of Wisconsin and Johns Hopkins University (not using 
federal funds), the debate over the legality and ethics of such research had 
 13. See CELERA GENOMICS, Our History, at http://www.celera.com/celera/history (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2005). 
 14. See HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF SCI., About the 
Human Genome Project, at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/ 
project/about.shtml (last modified Oct. 27, 2004). 
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already begun.15 There was, however, no formal prohibition on hPSC 
research except for the existing regulatory prohibition on the National 
Institutes of Health’s (NIH) use of any appropriated funds to create, 
destroy, discard, or jeopardize human embryos. Thus, to the extent that 
hPSCs were deemed to be embryos, the NIH could not fund research on 
them.16 Accordingly, the NIH sought and received from the General 
Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) a legal 
opinion that hPSCs are not actually embryos and thus fall outside of the 
funding prohibition for embryo research.17
Because President Clinton had offered no formal binding guidance on 
the question of federal funding of hPSC research—beyond 
recommendations or comments offered by his National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission (NBAC)—the Director of NIH decided to issue a moratorium 
on hPSC research beginning in January of 1999 and lasting until the NIH 
could consider the ethical, legal, and social implications of such research.18 
A working group of the Advisory Committee to the Director was created 
for this purpose in April of 1999 and ultimately concluded that the NIH 
could fund hPSC research, armed in no small part with the DHHS General 
Counsel opinion, as well as input from the scientific community and the 
NBAC.19 Subsequently, the NIH set to work on drafting guidelines for 
funding hPSC research, which were published in the Federal Register as 
proposed rulemaking on December 2, 1999.20 The public comment period 
ended on February 22, 2000, and the final guidelines (NIH hPSC 
Guidelines) were published, and took effect, on August 25, 2000.21
Presumably, at this point the NIH was fully authorized to fund hPSC 
research. In fact, it actively solicited funding proposals as late as January of 
2001 for this research, setting an initial deadline of March of 2001 for 
 15. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH Fact Sheet on Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Research 
Guidelines, at http://stemcells.nih.gov/news/newsArchives/stemfactsheet.asp (Jan. 
2001) [hereinafter NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Guidelines Fact Sheet]. 
 16. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(a)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 289(g)(b) (2000) (codified from 
the Public Health Service Act § 498(b))). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent 
Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976, 51,976 (Aug. 25, 2000); see also News Advisory, 
National Institutes of Health, NIH Publishes Draft Guidelines for Stem Cell Research, 
at http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/dec99/od-01.htm (Dec. 1, 1999) [hereinafter National 
Institutes of Health, News Advisory]. 
 19. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Guidelines Fact Sheet, supra note 15. 
 20. Draft National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Involving Human 
Pluripotent Stem Cells, 64 Fed. Reg. 67,576 (Dec. 2, 1999); see also National 
Institutes of Health, News Advisory, supra note 18. 
 21. National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem 
Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976. 
O'CONNOR PROOF 3 (MACRO)(SOC 031105) 3/15/2005  1:07:37 PM 
708 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:nnn 
 
funding proposals.22 However, after President George W. Bush took office 
in January of 2001 he evinced an intense interest in the debate over hPSC 
research, and, in particular, federal funding of such research. On August 9, 
2001 he gave the watershed public address that contained an order 
restricting federal funding of hPSC research to only that using the sixty 
then-existing hPSC lines.23 The NIH issued its own supportive, yet terse, 
statement acknowledging the President’s order that same day.24
In what may be evidence of some degree of scrambling or disarray in 
the wake of the President’s address and order, the NIH then issued a notice 
on August 23, 2001 indicating that it would begin a process to enable 
researchers to use federal funds to engage in hPSC research—now dubbed 
“human embryonic stem cell research”—only to supersede it with a very 
similar notice issued days later on August 27.25 Both notices made clear 
that researchers were prohibited from using any federal funds for hPSC 
research until the NIH put into place new policies and guidelines based on 
the President’s order. However, the main difference between the two 
notices seemed to be that while the first stated that only hPSC lines that 
existed “as of August 9, 2001” could be used, the later version clarified this 
to include lines whose “derivation process” began prior to 9:00 p.m. EST 
on August 9, 2001, meaning that so long as the destruction of the embryo 
to start a cell line had occurred before this precise moment in time, the 
resultant line could be used for research. The second notice also contained 
more detail about the NIH Human Embryonic Stem Cell Registry, to be 
created and posted on a webpage hosted by the NIH. One has to wonder, 
however, whether researchers were feverishly working ahead of the 
President’s address, which commenced at 8:01 p.m. CST at his ranch in 
Texas, thus 9:01 p.m. EST, to establish hPSC lines in anticipation of leaked 
news about the content, and impact, of the address, and the NIH wanted to 
respect those efforts as legal, right up until the address.26
 22. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Guidelines Fact Sheet, supra note 15. 
 23. Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research, 2 PUB. PAPERS 953 (Aug. 9, 2001); see 
also Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Embryonic Stem Cell Research, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/print/20010809-1.html (Aug. 9, 
2001). 
 24. See News Advisory, National Institutes of Health, NIH Statement on the President’s 
Stem Cell Address, at http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug2001/od-09.htm (Aug. 9, 
2001). 
 25. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH Funding of Research Using Specified Existing 
Human Embryonic Stem Cells (NOT-OD-01-0598), at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/ 
guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-01-058.html (Aug. 23, 2001); see also NAT’L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH, NIH Funding of Research Using Specified Existing Human Embryonic Stem 
Cells (NOT-OD-01-059), at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-
01-059.html (Aug. 27, 2001). 
 26. Presumably, any researchers attempting to work right up until the last possible 
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Two interesting questions are raised by the President’s order. First, 
had the NIH approved any hPSC research funding proposal, and if so, how 
did it unwind the funding commitment, assuming that the proposal did not 
happily rely only on one of the sixty enumerated hPSC lines? Second, had 
the Bush Administration made its own legal determination that hPSCs do 
not in fact constitute human embryos, in agreement with the earlier opinion 
of the DHHS General Counsel? If not, then no federal funding of research 
involving hPSCs, whether from lines existing at 9:00 p.m. EDT on August 
9, 2001 or not, would be permissible under the regulations promulgated 
under the Public Health Service Act.27 Thus, one can infer that the 
Administration determined that the DHHS’s legal position was sound. But 
then why limit funding to hPSCs that emanate from cell lines existing 
before the Presidential order? Researchers could not use federal funds to 
actually destroy the embryos as the first necessary step to create an hPSC 
either before or after the order. Thus, researchers would always have had to 
begin the derivation process without federal funds. 
The Administration’s position is not about refusing to fund work on 
human embryos then, but rather that allowing federal funding for hPSC 
research, which is legally permissible as it does not involve research on 
human embryos, encourages researchers to destroy human embryos outside 
of federally funded work so that the extracted hPSCs can then be used 
within federally funded projects. But such destruction outside of federally 
funded projects is legally permissible, assuming that consent of the donors 
is obtained and developmental milestones are respected in the same way 
that countless fertility clinics and abortion clinics are allowed to destroy 
unused human embryos every year in the United States. Thus, the 
Administration is trading off the substantial value of a robust federally 
funded hPSC research agenda, as advocated by many leading science and 
health researchers, against a speculative, yet still legally permissible, 
“harm” that human embryos might be destroyed solely for the purpose of 
starting a new hPSC line (as opposed to opportunistic use of human 
embryos destroyed for other reasons) outside of any federal funding. 
Clearly other approaches were possible. At the same time, the 
Administration asserts that the enumerated sixty-odd cell lines are 
completely adequate to support just such a robust federally funded hPSC 
research agenda.28 This, of course, has been heavily contested, with 
opponents of the policy asserting that many of these lines are unusable, 
moment in this manner did so without the use of federal funds, which would have 
been unavailable due to the pre-existing prohibition on federal funds for research 
involving human embryos anyway. See HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 14. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research, supra note 23. 
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unavailable, or just unsuitable for certain research projects.29
Nonetheless, the NIH dutifully withdrew its hPSC Guidelines first in 
part,30 and then in toto,31 during November of 2001. The NIH ultimately 
issued new guidelines in March of 2002, finally funding hPSC projects, 
allowing the Bush Administration to correctly claim that it was the first to 
fund such research. Of course, the Clinton Administration had not 
prohibited or opposed funding hPSC research, but rather had worked fairly 
and expeditiously to establish the original guidelines that were put in place 
in 2000. Thus, in theory, and given mere historical happenstance, the 
Clinton Administration could easily have been the first to fund hPSC 
research. Further, it is not too speculative to say that a Gore Administration 
would have retained the original guidelines and a more robust federally 
funded hPSC research agenda would have ensued. 
Some further evidence of this is that the next Democratic presidential 
candidate, Senator John Kerry, in fact added a pro-hPSC research plank to 
his ticket’s platform—presumably offering funding opportunities to hPSC 
lines derived after the fateful August 9, 2001 deadline—playing on the 
strong arguments from the scientific and medical community that the Bush 
policy was inadequate. Of course, it is unclear whether there is solid 
empirical evidence that federal funding is needed to further progress in 
stem cell research. Further, as complete speculation, perhaps the Bush 
Administration views reduced or limited federal funding for science and 
technology as a good way to push its larger privatization initiative: The 
private sector will be forced to take on a greater proportion of scientific 
research, thus freeing up federal funds and resources to focus on other core 
government projects, or as a means to reduce taxes and government 
spending even further. 
C. California’s Proposition 71 
While the presidential race set out some impressive rhetoric about the 
need for federal funding to realize the goals of hPSC research, and under 
what restrictions such funding could occur, it did not really present much in 
the way of empirical evidence that extensive federal funding is needed. It is 
hard to read too much into George W. Bush’s victory in relation to some 
sort of public statement or mandate about his hPSC funding policy because 
 29. See Ceci Connolly & Rick Weiss, Stem Cell Colonies’ Viability Unproven, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 28, 2001, at A1. 
 30. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Notice of Withdrawal of NIH Guidelines for Research 
Using Pluripotent Stem Cells (NOT-OD-02-007), at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/ 
guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-02-007.html (Nov. 7, 2001). 
 31. National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem 
Cells, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,107 (Nov. 14, 2001). 
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there were clearly so many other factors at play in the election. But other 
electoral contests did give us some targeted evidence for how segments of 
the U.S. population perceive the question of public funding of hPSC 
research. 
Most notable was the solid passage of Proposition 71 in California.32 
In part as a response to the Bush policy for limited funding for hPSC 
research, Californians were presented with an initiative to fund stem cell 
research (using both hPSCs and adult stem cells) to the tune of $3 billion 
over ten years.33 The measure authorized California to raise these funds 
through general obligation bonds.34 It also created the California Institute 
for Regenerative Medicine (the CIRM) to award grants and loans for stem 
cell research using the proceeds from these bond sales, and to manage 
subsequent research under these awards.35 The CIRM is to be governed by 
a twenty-nine member Independent Citizen’s Oversight Committee 
(ICOC), with members selected from University of California campuses, a 
public or private California university (other than the specified UC 
campuses), non-profit academic and medical research institutions, 
companies experienced in developing medical therapies, and disease 
research advocacy groups.36 Priority for funding is to be given to hPSC and 
progenitor cell research that “cannot, or is unlikely to, receive timely or 
sufficient funding, unencumbered by limitations that would impede the 
research.”37
Because Proposition 71 passed by fifty-nine percent of the vote, and 
is geared towards funding stem cell research that the federal government, 
under the Bush Administration, is unlikely to fund, one can reasonably 
infer that a majority of Californians: (1) do not agree with the Bush 
Administration’s stance; and (2) believe that stem cell research requires 
public funding. Of course, it is not clear how closely examined the 
proposition was by many voters—indeed one newspaper account called it a 
“cause celèbre,” and suggested that the influence of celebrities such as 
 32. The vote was officially tallied at 59.1% for, 40.9% against, and 5.6% votes not cast. 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, State Ballot Measures, at 
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2004_general/formatted_ballot_measures_detail.p
df (last visited Feb. 4, 2005). 
 33. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 125290.10-125290.70 (West Supp. 
2005). 
 34. Id. §§ 125291.10-125291.85; see also Attorney General of the State of California, 
Official Title and Summary: Proposition 71, at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/ 
propositions/prop71-title.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2005). 
 35. CAL. CONST., art. XXXV (adopted Nov. 2, 2004); see also Attorney General of the 
State of California, supra note 34. 
 36. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125290.20(a) (West Supp. 2005). 
 37. Id. § 125290.60(c)(1)(C). 
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Brad Pitt likely helped the measure in no small part.38 At the same time, of 
course, other celebrities such as Mel Gibson came out against the 
measure.39 To the extent that the voters were looking for more 
academically credible advocates of the initiative, they were apt to be 
swayed by the endorsements of twenty-odd Nobel laureates, including Paul 
Berg of Stanford and Roger Guillemin of the Salk Institute.40
Many voters no doubt fell in line with the somewhat simplistic 
position that this was a liberal versus conservative and/or pro-choice versus 
pro-life issue. But in neither the official Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of 
Proposition 71 nor the Argument Against Proposition 71 presented in the 
election materials was there an opposition to stem cell research, embryonic 
or otherwise.41 Instead, the former argued that an increase in human 
embryo cloning through somatic cell nuclear transfer, as might be the case 
under an aggressive stem cell research program, could endanger the lives 
and well being of the thousands of women needed to provide the initial 
eggs through the use of high dose hormones and egg extraction 
procedures.42 Further, it questioned the wisdom of prioritizing the funding 
of this type of research over other types of research with more proven track 
records.43 Perhaps most interesting, these arguments were advanced by 
Judy Norsigian, Executive Director of Our Bodies Ourselves, and others 
who are most decidedly pro-choice.44
The Argument Against Proposition 71, on the other hand, focused 
largely on the “boondoggle” aspects of the measure, including a lack of 
accountability, closed-door meetings, and the funneling of a staggering 
amount of money to “corporate research” that would ultimately result in 
windfall profits to private corporations.45 These criticisms are echoed in a 
 38. Stuart Leavenworth, The Opaque Petri Dish, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 9, 2005, at E1. 
 39. See Kathryn Jean Lopez, Braveheart Stands Athwart a Brave New World, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE (Nov. 1, 2004), at http://www.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/gibson 
200411010950.asp. 
 40. See Leon Thal et al., Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 71, at 
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov04/prop_71_argument_against_rebuttal_to_arg
ument_against.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). 
 41. See SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF CAL., Arguments and Rebuttals: Proposition 71, at 
http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/prop71-arguments.htm (last visited Feb. 
18, 2005). 
 42. See Judy Norsigian et al., Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 71, at 
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov04/prop_71_argument_in_favor_rebuttal_to_ar
gument_in_favor.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Tom McClintock et al., Argument Against Proposition 71, at http://www.voterguide. 
ss.ca.gov/propositions/prop71-arguments.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005). 
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widely-distributed letter written by Mitch Kapor, the famed software 
innovator and current Chair and President of the Open Source Applications 
Foundation.46 Kapor argues that Proposition 71 is “the wrong way to do the 
right thing” on three issues: (1) the conflict of interest created by the fact 
that many of the members of the ICOC will control the flow of money that 
will likely wind up back at their home institutions; (2) the Institute is 
authorized to act outside of the normal federal and state rules regarding 
such things as informed consent and protection of human research subjects 
(because these regulations are generally tied to funding agreements); and 
(3) the IP rights and mechanisms for state recoupment of its investment are 
murky which will likely lead to protracted legal battles and diminished 
returns to California.47 This last point will be considered further below. 
Regardless of whether you believe the pro and con arguments 
presented in the Proposition 71 debates, it is again interesting that neither 
of the official opponent groups opposed stem cell research. Instead, they 
both seemed to go out of their way to make it clear that they supported it. 
Further, neither group argued that stem cell research did not need public 
funding or that it could adequately proceed under private and/or corporate 
funding. Rather, they argued that there is other research that is more 
immediately deserving of state funding and/or that this particular initiative 
was not the best way to go about channeling public funds to the research. 
At the same time, opposition groups seemed slow to pick up on what 
might be the most important flaw of the initiative: the absence of a strong 
mechanism to recoup the state’s investment and the failure to allocate IP 
(and other) ownership rights in the resultant medical breakthroughs. 
Indeed, Kapor’s letter—the clearest statement of this issue in advance of 
the election—is dated October 25, 2004, only a little more than a week 
before election day.48 Outside of presumed loan repayment revenues, 
Proposition 71 merely provides for a direct return on state investment 
through the authorization of the ICOC to: 
[E]stablish standards that require that all grants and loan awards 
be subject to intellectual property agreements that balance the 
opportunity of the State of California to benefit from the patents, 
royalties, and licenses that result from basic research, therapy 
development, and clinical trials with the need to assure that 
essential medical research is not unreasonably hindered by the 
intellectual property agreements.49
 46. Mitch Kapor, For Stem Cell Research, Against Proposition 71 (California), at 
http://www.ofbyandfor.org/node/view/830 (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125290.30(h) (West Supp. 2005). 
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In the abstract this sounds reasonable and desirable enough. But, the 
devil is in the details: Proposition 71 essentially hands off determination of 
the correct balance and the means to effectively achieve that balance to the 
brand new and untested ICOC. In contrast, as discussed below, the federal 
Bayh-Dole Act that governs the allocation of IP rights arising from 
federally funded research, articulates such allocation in detail, including 
requirements for specific contractual clauses that must be part of funding 
agreements.  Proposition 71 instead grants enormous discretionary power 
to an untested body that will determine the success (or failure) of a $3 
billion venture with taxpayers’ money. Legislative grants of discretionary 
power can, of course, be a necessary and positive means of preventing 
legislative paralysis based on the extreme difficulty of working out the fine 
details of a new program’s implementation. Further, the grant of 
discretionary power to an agency can allow the program’s implementation 
to be flexible in response to new data and insights that arise as such 
implementation plays out. But sometimes the grant appears to be so big and 
vague as to suggest that the legislature is simply punting on the hard 
questions. The price for such avoidance tactics can be an implemented 
program that seems to have strayed quite far from the form advertised in 
the political battles leading to passage of the enabling statute. 
Because Proposition 71 is an independent measure taken directly to 
the voters at large in California, it is hard to know what intentions to 
ascribe to such a vague grant of discretionary authority to a quasi-
government agency. But the result is the same—Californians can have no 
idea what form these IP and recoupment contract provisions will take until 
after the ICOC finally establishes the standards. By contrast, as was briefly 
discussed above, the federal Bayh-Dole Act is far more specific in 
allocation of IP rights whenever federal funds are used in research that 
leads to a patentable invention. The Act also provides some safety valves 
for situations where funding recipients and/or their exclusive licensees 
appear to be improperly using these federally funded inventions. As 
discussed below, these have been quite controversial. Proposition 71 is 
troubling particularly because it means that Californians were asked to vote 
blindly for a $3 billion investment gambit whose IP rights and return on 
investment rules and procedures have yet to be established in any effective 
or binding manner. A similar concern was raised recently in an article on 
Proposition 71 in the Sacramento Bee: 
Imagine that a partnership of scientists and Hollywood 
moguls urged you to invest in a promising but controversial field 
of medical research. 
The partnership would control how your money is spent, 
based on recommendations from appointed “working groups” 
whose meetings would be kept secret from you.  
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Would you accept such a deal? Probably not.50
Admittedly, the measure does suggest that the state will receive an 
indirect return on its investment in other ways, such as: 
[B]y funding scientific and medical research that will 
significantly reduce state health care costs in the future…. 
… by creating projects, jobs, and therapies that will 
generate millions of dollars in new tax revenues in our state…. 
… [and by] [a]dvanc[ing] the biotech industry in California 
to world leadership, as an economic engine for California’s 
future.51
And there is some evidence that at least the last part of this 
justification might work too, with early media accounts documenting what, 
to paraphrase former presidential candidate Ross Perot, might be described 
as a giant sucking sound as star talent researchers, life sciences 
management, and venture capitalists are drawn into a state that is 
committed to fund stem cell research in a way that neither the federal 
government nor other states are currently able to do.52 Further, the voter 
material for Proposition 71 asserts that “to the extent that the UC system 
receives a share of the grants awarded by the institute, it could attract 
additional federal or private research funding for this same purpose.”53 This 
sounds like a benefit, but it also represents the heart of the problem raised 
by this article: multiple funding sources will lead to nasty battles over 
ownership and control of whatever medical breakthroughs arise from hPSC 
research. 
D. Other State and Local Stem Cell and Life Sciences Research 
Funding Initiatives 
Outside of what appears to be a strong message from California 
voters that they both perceive the Bush policy to be inadequate and believe 
that there is a need for enhanced public funding of stem cell research, there 
are suggestions that citizens and leaders of other parts of the country were, 
 50. Leavenworth, supra note 38. 
 51. Attorney General of the State of California, Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 71, 
available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/prop71text.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2005). 
 52. See Jonathan Knight, Joys Match Fears as California Agrees to Stem-Cell Proposal, 
NATURE, Nov. 10, 2004, available at http://www.nature.com/news/2004/041108/ 
pf/432135a_pf.html; Ceci Connolly, Calif. Stem Cell Initiative Could Backfire 
Nationally, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2004, at A15. 
 53. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF CAL., Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, at 
http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/prop71-analysis.htm (last visited Feb. 
18, 2005). 
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or are now, thinking along similar lines. In Washington State, then 
candidate, now Governor, Christine Gregoire proposed a “Washington 
Institute of Stem Cell Research,” possibly as a result of the Kerry 
campaign’s espousal of its support for enhanced federal funding of such 
research.54 It is not clear yet whether Gregoire will follow through on this 
campaign plank. In Boston, Mayor Thomas Menino announced a proposal 
to create a city venture fund to invest in biotechnology companies that 
promise to establish facilities within city limits.55 Meanwhile, Governor 
Jim Doyle of Wisconsin has announced a stem cell research funding 
initiative that will invest $750 million of public and private money to build 
two research centers and support hPSC research.56 Part of this funding must 
still be approved by the Wisconsin legislature, but other parts appear to be 
fully under Doyle’s discretionary control.57 New Jersey’s Acting Governor, 
Richard J. Codey, also recently announced a major stem cell research 
funding push to the tune of $1 billion over the next ten years primarily for 
the already existing Stem Cell Institute of New Jersey.58 The New Jersey 
initiative seeks to distinguish itself from Proposition 71 both because it will 
locate all the funding and research at the Stem Cell Institute of New Jersey, 
rather than dispersing funds and research across the state as California 
plans to do, and because it will encourage its researchers to collaborate 
with researchers in other states.59 Rounding out this new gold rush, various 
officials in Connecticut,60 New York,61 Minnesota,62 and Illinois,63 have all 
announced some sort of plan to dramatically increase state funding for stem 
cell research, in no small part as a defensive measure against the 
 54. Elizabeth M. Gillespie, Gore Plugs Stem-Cell Research at N.J. Event, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 10, 2004, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-10-10-gore-stems_ 
x.htm. 
 55. Ross Kerber, For Job Stimulus, Boston Mulls Direct Investments, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Oct. 18, 2004, at C1. 
 56. Associated Press, Wisconsin Announces Stem Cell Funding, MSNBC, Nov. 18, 2004, 
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6515491/. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Associated Press, NJ Stem Cell Research Leader with Funding?, KYW-TV 
PHILA., Jan. 10, 2005, at http://kyw.com/Local%20News/local_story_010145006. 
html. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Alison McCook, An Eastern U.S. Stem Cell Hub?, THE SCIENTIST, at 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20050120/02/ (Jan. 20, 2005). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Chad Hamblin, Funding Proposed For Stem Cell Research, MINN. DAILY, available 
at http://www.mndaily.com/articles/2004/12/13/11714/ (Dec. 13, 2004). 
 63. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the State of Illinois, Hynes Proposes 
Creation of Stem Cell Research Institute, available at http://www.ioc.state.il.us/ 
office/IOCNews/ViewNewsRelease.cfm?ID=2070837170 (Nov. 23, 2004). 
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anticipated “brain drain” that will result from Proposition 71. And these 
recent initiatives are all on top of previous impressive state funding 
commitments to the life sciences, such as Pennsylvania’s pledge of $250 
million, which the state expects to receive in settlements from litigation 
against the tobacco companies, ’to life sciences research and 
commercialization centers across the Commonwealth.64
The sum of all of these initiatives seems to be that there is at least a 
compelling perception in many parts of the country that some level of 
public funding for stem cell research will be needed if this promising area 
of inquiry is to have any reasonable chance of success. There remain 
questions about whether the research will in fact lead to any cures or 
therapies in even the next couple of decades. Further, the moral and ethical 
concerns over this research will continue to ebb and flow, with possible 
political ramifications for the continuance of the research. But, as will be 
discussed below, early stage basic scientific research, such as the current 
state of stem cell research, has historically been funded primarily by public 
dollars in the United States. At the same time, some argue that public 
funding is desirable precisely because it will result in more accountability, 
careful regulation, and public scrutiny of controversial research.65 A 
participant in this Symposium even went so far as to claim that public 
funding means that the results wind up in the public domain.66 However, 
neither of these assertions is exactly true. Once again, the devil is in the 
details, and the most relevant details for the stem cell research and its 
funding initiatives lie in the IP rights allocation clauses of the funding 
agreements that pay for any particular work. 
II.  THE GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS FOR FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH 
As mentioned above, federal funding has supported an enormous 
amount of basic scientific research in this country throughout the twentieth 
century.67 Private money is not as interested in basic research because such 
research is almost by definition at the very early stage of exploration and is 
not yet directed towards a commercializable technology. This means that 
any calculation of a return on investment—both in amount and 
 64. David Wenner, Biotechnology Gets Big Shot in Arm, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Apr. 4, 
2002, at B5. 
 65. Gillespie, supra note 54. 
 66. Suzanne Kadereit, An Overview of Stem Cell Research, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. ___ 
(2005). 
 67. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Reviews of 
National Science Policy: United States (Paris, 1968) (showing an annual growth rate 
for federal government spending on R&D of 24.9% between 1940 and 1965, 
culminating in the federal government’s financing of 64% of all U.S. R&D at the end 
of that period). 
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timeframe—is so speculative as to be nearly useless. Accordingly, private 
funding of basic research is often more of an altruistic gesture than an 
investment venture. At the same time, many educated citizens and leaders 
buy into the view that basic research is important because it leads, 
serendipitously and indirectly, to the most revolutionary breakthroughs. 
Stories of the accidental discovery of penicillin, for example, resound in 
many of these individuals’ thinking and makes the rationale for the funding 
of basic research nearly an axiomatic principle. But, with private money 
largely out of the picture, the only other solution is public funding. 
Accordingly, following in the path of the noble civic investment that 
led to the great state land grant universities of the late 1800s, the 1900s 
became the century of unprecedented public investment in basic scientific 
research. In particular, World War II and the race for the atomic bomb 
showed the essential nature of scientific and technological primacy for 
national security in the modern world, as well as the link between the most 
advanced theoretical science—physics in this case—and the very survival 
of the nation. As World War II gave way to the Cold War, the need for 
accelerated scientific and technological progress did not diminish as it had 
in the wake of previous wars. Cementing the permanent status of the 
science and technology race, the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in 
the 1950s was perhaps the final push that opened the floodgates of federal 
spending on all sorts of R&D, basic and applied, in public institutions and 
even in private contractor labs. 
But the growing wealth of government funded research also led to 
questions of its ownership and use. Private contractors wanted to retain any 
resulting patent rights, especially where they might cover commercial, 
civilian applications, but certain factions in the federal government did not 
want research funding to turn into a windfall for private corporations. At 
the same time, the mounting inventory of patentable inventions developed 
in government and university or non-profit institution labs was not 
benefiting anyone, as the private commercial sector that was needed to turn 
these inventions into saleable products distributed to retail outlets was often 
unwilling to do so on anything less than exclusive license rights. Thus a 
long-simmering debate commenced shortly after World War II over 
whether the government funding agency should grant the title or merely a 
license to patentable inventions arising from funded research. In time, this 
would be largely resolved by first the Statement of Government Patent 
Policy issued by President John F. Kennedy in 1963 (Kennedy Patent 
Policy),68 and then later by the passage of Bayh-Dole itself in 1980.69
 68. The Kennedy order is actually set out in two parts. The first part, the Memorandum 
for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1959-1963), 
sets out the policy and objectives and directs the agencies to follow the rules and 
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In many important ways, Bayh-Dole simply codified the Kennedy 
Patent Policy, particularly in its definitions of key terms and focus on 
balancing the competing values of free public access to federally funded 
inventions, on the one hand, and the need for exclusive rights as an 
incentive for private sector commercialization of otherwise unused 
patented inventions.70 Further, Bayh-Dole adopted nearly wholesale the 
crucial concept, mechanisms, and language of the “march-in rights,” as 
discussed in more detail below, set out first in the Kennedy Patent Policy.71 
But in one equally critical way, the two sets of rules were very different: 
Whereas the Kennedy Patent Policy explicitly rejected a “one-size fits all” 
approach to the title vs. license question,72 Bayh-Dole comes down firmly 
on the side of granting title to the patentable invention to the 
researcher/contractor, provided that the contractor reports the invention in a 
timely fashion and then affirmatively elects to retain such title.73
But even while Bayh-Dole appears to side with the contractor—at 
least insofar as the contractor is a non-profit or small business because 
Bayh-Dole does not speak to situations where larger businesses are the 
contractor74—it does retain and expand many of the encumbrances on the 
title grant, where the contractor elects to retain title in the subject invention, 
that were first established by the Kennedy Patent Policy. First, the federal 
funding agency must have “a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, 
paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United 
States any subject invention throughout the world….”75 Second, the 
guidelines, set out in the second part, which contains the actual “Statement of 
Government Patent Policy,” 3 C.F.R. 862 (1959-1963). 
 69. The history of U.S. government patent policy is an extensive and fascinating topic, 
but outside the scope of this Symposium article. The cursory version presented here is 
based on another manuscript I am currently drafting. See Sean M. O’Connor, The 
Evolution of Government Research Patent Policy: Putting Bayh-Dole Into the Proper 
Context (working paper on file with author). A somewhat different version can be 
found in Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents 
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 
(1996). 
 70. Compare the “Policy and objective” section of Bayh-Dole, 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000), to 
the policy objective set out in the Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies part of the Kennedy Patent Policy, supra note 68. 
 71. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 203 (1988) with 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (1963). 
 72. See 3 C.F.R. 861. 
 73. See 35 U.S.C. § 202 (1988). 
 74. However, a subsequent order by President Ronald Reagan in 1983 adopted the rules 
of Bayh-Dole as the official executive branch policy across all funding agencies for 
large businesses as well. See Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies: Government Patent Policy, PUB. PAPERS 248 (Feb. 18, 1983). 
 75. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4). The funding agency is authorized to request even further 
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contractor must give notice of the federal funding, and the concomitant 
rights of the federal funding agency in the subject invention, in both the 
patent application and any resultant issued patent.76 Third, non-profit 
contractors may not assign their rights to the subject invention to any other 
party without the approval of the funding agency, unless the assignment is 
to an external technology transfer or patent portfolio management entity, in 
which case that entity is prohibited from any further assignments of the 
subject invention without the approval of the funding agency.77
The fourth title encumbrance, march-in rights, is actually a set of 
conditions for when the funding agency can exercise a type of compulsory 
license. The set of conditions that constitute march-in rights is also a 
continuation from the Kennedy Patent Policy, and is perhaps the most well-
known—and most contested—of the provisions. The march-in rights 
provide the funding agency with the authority to: 
[R]equire the contractor, an assignee or exclusive licensee of a 
subject invention to grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or 
exclusive license in any field of use to a responsible applicant or 
applicants, upon terms that are reasonable under the 
circumstances, and if the contractor, assignee, or exclusive 
licensee refuses such request, to grant such a license itself, if the 
Federal agency determines that such— 
(a) action is necessary because the contractor or assignee 
has not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time, 
effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject 
invention in such field of use; 
(b) action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs 
which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or 
their licensees; 
(c) action is necessary to meet requirements for public use 
specified by Federal regulations and such requirements are not 
reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees; or 
(d) action is necessary because the agreement required by 
section 204 [that any exclusive licensee must substantially 
manufacture the products embodying the subject invention in the 
United States] has not been obtained or waived or because a 
licensee of the exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention 
in the United States is in breach of its agreement obtained 
pursuant to section 204 [and therefore no exclusive license is 
license grants over this statutory minimum license grant. 
 76. Id. § 202(c)(6). 
 77. Id. § 202(c)(7)(A). 
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permitted or valid].78
As will be seen below, the proper scope of march-in rights has been 
hotly contested – even as they apparently have never been formally 
exercised by the government. This is true despite at least two formal 
proceedings involving petitions requesting that the relevant funding agency 
exercise its march-in rights.79 One important dimension of this debate 
centers on the question of whether march-in rights impart a pricing control 
or regulation authority on the funding agency or only a more limited 
authority to ensure that the subject invention is actually commercialized 
and brought to market. 
The technology transfer system codified by Bayh-Dole is also subject 
to two further criticisms. One is based on a claim that the law as 
implemented effectively forces the public to “pay twice” for products 
arising out of federally funded inventions.80 We pay first through our tax 
dollars that are used to fund the federal agency grants to contractors for 
their research. Then we pay again through the high retail prices enabled by 
the allowance of exclusive control of the patents ensuing from that 
research. But this argument is more persuasive in situations where the 
patent arising from the federal funding effectively covers the eventual 
product that will be brought to market. Even then, the costs associated with 
ramping up a manufacturing, distribution, marketing, and sales operation 
for the product means that the final retail price may be quite expensive. 
Further, it is not as if the commercializing entity gets the exclusive license 
for free—universities and non-profits are increasingly striking savvy 
bargains requiring substantial upfront payments, patent prosecution and 
maintenance fees, and minimum royalties. Thus, one might equally 
question what is happening with the money that universities are making 
from patenting and licensing federally funded inventions. 
The real test would be whether a comparably situated product that 
was developed from a patent arising from privately financed research was 
placed on the market at a far higher price. This would effectively 
demonstrate the discount the public receives because the first company did 
not incur the same patent R&D expenses. Of course, the first company 
would then be foolish not to raise its prices to capture the extra profit 
margin since the public may be willing to pay the higher price, assuming 
that its product is in fact a viable market substitute for the other company’s 
 78. Id. § 203(1). 
 79. See infra Part III. 
 80. See Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 1666; Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t 
We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced 
Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed Upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in 
Part From Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631, 658 (2001). 
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product. But at the same time, the second company may not be able to enter 
the market at such a higher price, as it would be unable to capture market 
shares as against the first company’s (federally subsidized) lower price. In 
this way, the Bayh-Dole system could theoretically work to keep prices 
down overall in markets with products that embody federally funded 
research results. This seems to fly in the face of an economic reality in 
which prices seem to spiral ever higher—especially in the science and 
technology-heavy markets—and few would believe that the grant of 
exclusive patent rights leads anywhere but to higher retail prices. 
The problem with all of this armchair theorizing is that quite a 
number of largely untestable scenarios can be spun out: What if the 
company with the federally funded patent tries to enter the market after the 
company with a self-funded patent? Will it deploy a cut rate to steal market 
share quickly from its competitor, or will it come in just under the 
competitor’s price so as to maximize the profit margin on each unit sold? 
Yet, precisely because patented technologies are at the core of these 
scenarios the reality check of comparing acceptable market substitutes is 
particularly difficult. In fact, relatively few products embody only the 
patent that arises from federally funded university or non-profit research. In 
no small part this is because much of the research that is funded is early 
stage, basic science that often has no commercial product in sight, or that at 
least will require substantial translational R&D to bring it to the level of 
commercialization. This translational R&D, combined with the standard 
commercialization costs of scaling a production and sales operation, lends 
some support to industry arguments that it is not improperly leveraging off 
of or profiting from its exclusive, albeit paid, licenses, but rather simply 
charging fair market value for what it has invested to bring the product to 
market—which may, again, include upfront payments, patent fees, and 
royalties to one or more universities/non-profits. 
But as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has shown an 
increasing willingness to issue patents on early stage, pre-commercializable 
research results, a more trenchant concern has been raised: this second 
main criticism of the technology transfer system created by Bayh-Dole 
focuses on the USPTO’s current “easy patenting” stance in combination 
with Bayh-Dole’s strong incentives for universities and non-profits to 
patent research results, and argues that too many patents are being issued, 
particularly on so-called “up-stream” research results and research 
tools/platforms.81 This, in turn, leads to “patent thickets,” especially in the 
life sciences, that make it prohibitively difficult and/or expensive to either 
conduct new R&D or to commercialize important new technologies. It is 
 81. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 (2003). 
O'CONNOR PROOF 3 (MACRO)(SOC 031105) 3/15/2005  1:07:37 PM 
2005] IP RIGHTS & STEM CELL RESEARCH 723 
 
prohibitively difficult because the researcher and her company must 
carefully set a course of R&D through a dense maze of sometimes 
overlapping patent claims to avoid infringement. And it is prohibitively 
expensive because ultimately the researcher and her company wind up 
paying multiple royalties to different patent holders—sometimes called 
“royalty stacking”—just to engage in the necessary R&D and bring a 
product to market. 
Despite the pros and cons of federal research funding under the Bayh-
Dole technology transfer system, at least this system is reasonably well 
fleshed out in the statute and the rules promulgated under it. Further, a fair 
bit of received wisdom has accumulated within the segments of the 
technology transfer system—universities, non-profits, start-ups, established 
technology companies, and venture capitalists—that arguably has achieved 
the level of settled expectations around things like the allocation and use of 
IP rights when federal funding is involved. This is all in marked contrast to 
the status of IP rights under state, local, or private funding. But, because 
federal funding is at least partly behind so much university and non-profit 
patentable research, the Bayh-Dole system’s set of rules and settled 
expectations tends to be the standard. The next Part of this Article will 
consider what happens when federal funding becomes a minor or limited 
player as it has in hPSC research because of the Bush Administration 
policy. 
III.  STEM CELL RESEARCH WILL BE A VICTIM OF ITS OWN SUCCESS 
At this point no one really seems to know whether any type of stem 
cell research —adult or hPSC—will live up to the hype that has surrounded 
the whole area. We do know that some therapies involving adult stem cells 
have been demonstrated and deployed with a fair degree of success.82 But 
these therapies are not the home runs that are usually associated with the 
most wide-eyed prognostications for stem cell research overall. This is 
because adult stem cells are generally only multipotent, meaning that they 
can differentiate into only a few specific types of human body cells.83 In 
particular, adult stem cells generally exist in certain parts of the human 
body such as bone marrow and muscle, and organs such as the liver and 
 82. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Stem Cell Information: FAQs, at 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/faqs.asp#classes (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) [hereinafter 
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, FAQs]. One type of adult stem cells in particular—
hematopoietic stem cells (HSCs)—that exist in the bone marrow and create blood 
cells have been used successfully to treat leukemia, lymphoma, and other blood 
disorders, either through bone marrow transplants or advanced harvesting or 
collecting techniques. Id. Other adult human stem cells have been demonstrated in 
therapies for diabetes and advanced kidney cancer. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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skin, and then are limited to differentiation into only the component cells of 
that tissue or organ.84 However, there is evidence that some adult stem cells 
may have extended “plasticity” such that they can in fact be directed to 
develop into the cells of a different tissue or organ.85
At the other end of the scale, a fertilized human egg is deemed 
totipotent as it can develop into any and all types of cells of the human 
body, and, of course, into an embryo, a fetus, and then a self-sustaining 
human being.86 But, in between the totipotent egg and the generally 
multipotent adult stem cells, in terms of their ability to develop into 
different types of cells, are the pluripotent human embryonic stem cells, or 
what we have been referring to as “hPSCs.” Pluripotent stem cells can 
develop into nearly any type of cell in the adult human body, save those 
needed to develop the human fetus in the first place.87 HPSCs have 
generated most of the strongest excitement inside and outside of the 
scientific community because they, at least theoretically, have the potential 
to be directed into regenerating entire tissues and organs of the adult body, 
such that many terminal diseases could be completely cured.88 But such 
applications are usually considered to be a decade or so away, and in fact 
may never come to fruition.89 A somewhat less spectacular sounding goal 
for hPSCs—and adult stem cells for that matter—is as a means for studying 
normal cell development that would shed light on why that process 
sometimes goes astray, leading to debilitating medical problems such as 
cancer and birth defects.90 Therapies, cures, or perhaps even preventive 
measures might be developed from this knowledge and controlled 
experimentation with the cell differentiation process.91
The point of this Article is not to debate when, whether, or how stem 
cell research will be translated into revolutionary therapies for “Parkinson’s 
and Alzheimer’s diseases, spinal cord injury, stroke, burns, heart disease, 
diabetes, osteoarthritis, and rheumatoid arthritis.”92 Instead, this Article 
merely relies on the premise that at least some of these therapies will be 
demonstrated and ultimately made available commercially. So long as this 
happens, then the nightmare tussles over ownership and control will begin. 
 84. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Stem Cell Information: Stem Cell Basics, at § IV, at 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics2.asp (last modified June 10, 2004) 
[hereinafter NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Stem Cell Basics]. 
 85. Id. 
 86. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, FAQs, supra note 82. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Stem Cell Basics, supra note 84, at § 6. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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First up would be the private sector corporations jockeying to control—or 
at least tap into—the mammoth revenue streams that flow from a 
blockbuster, life-saving therapy. But next would be the slowly developing 
murmur and then roar from the public as to why only the wealthy can 
afford the likely exorbitant prices that will be charged. Further, to the 
extent that any federal, state or local public funds were used in the research 
leading up to commercialization of the therapy, the question may well be 
why it is not available for free, or at least at a serious discount, to the 
public. This clamor will increase proportionally to the success of the 
therapies, such that if anything near the expected revolutionary life saving 
advances come out of the research, then the public may well find 
themselves in their own revolutionary mode when their access to these 
crucial regimes is effectively denied. 
The rest of this Part will sketch the likely funding scenarios for stem 
cell research and then assess their implications for the ownership, control, 
and public response issues in the event of a “home run” in the research. It 
will also look at two recent controversies regarding the patentable results of 
federally funded life sciences research as an indication of what is in store 
for any successful commercialization of stem cell research. 
A. Funding for hPSC Research 
1. Federal Funding 
As discussed in Part I above, current federal funding for hPSC 
research is limited to research that uses only hPSCs from the cell lines 
existing at the time President Bush made his address to the nation. Original 
estimates put the number of such cell lines at sixty to seventy, but currently 
available cell line listings in the NIH Human Embryonic Stem Cell 
Registry (the Registry) number only twenty-two.93 At least in part due to 
this small number of available approved hPSC lines, the total funding of 
hPSC research by NIH currently stands at approximately $25 million 
annually.94 It is unclear whether this funding level will increase over the 
years. But wherever such funding is applied, the full set of rights and 
obligations under Bayh-Dole—as sketched out above in Part II—will 
govern the use of any patentable inventions that result. Further, it is likely 
that any and all mainstream research performed in non-profit and/or 
university labs using hPSC lines listed in the Registry will be done under at 
least some federal funding: the NIH, under the Bush Administration, 
probably wants to grant as much federal funding for eligible hPSC research 
 93. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, FAQs, supra note 82. 
 94. Ivan Oransky, California OKs Stem Cell Measure, THE SCIENTIST, at 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20041103/02 (Nov. 3, 2004). 
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as possible to show its commitment to stem cell research in particular, and 
science in general, to counter criticisms that it is anti-science; and the labs 
would be foolish for not taking advantage of this largesse where it exists, 
so as to be better able to cover the funding gap for the greater portion of 
hPSC research that will be ineligible for federal funding under the Bush 
Administration policies. 
The trickier question is whether Bayh-Dole will wind up applying to 
patentable inventions arising from an overall research program that 
includes work with both eligible and ineligible hPSC lines. At first blush, it 
would seem that such a research program is prohibited. The NIH is clear 
that, under the Bush Administration: 
No federal funds may be used, either directly or indirectly, 
to support research on human embryonic stem cell lines that do 
not meet the criteria established by President Bush on August 9, 
2001. Cell lines not listed on the NIH Human Embryonic Stem 
Cell Registry do not meet these criteria. Thus, research on lines 
(or their derivatives) not listed on the NIH Human Embryonic 
Stem Cell Registry may not be supported by federal funds. 
… 
Scientists who receive federal funds and study both 
federally fundable and non-federally fundable human embryonic 
stem cells must charge research costs for study of non-federal 
lines only to non-federal sources of funding. With respect to 
indirect costs, such as facilities and administrative (F&A) costs, 
scientists should adhere to the guidelines in applicable federal 
cost principles such as OMB Circular A-21 (Colleges and 
Universities). These documents describe how to keep budget and 
accounting records so as to prevent federal funds from 
improperly subsidizing non-federally supported research. These 
cost principles are also applicable to work on non-federally 
fundable activities using human embryonic stem cells not 
included in the Stem Cell Registry.95
This emphasis on both direct and indirect costs would seem to push 
researchers (and their institutions) to rigidly separate research projects 
using eligible hPSC lines from those that do not. The potency of the 
“indirect costs” language is that it forces funding recipients to consider 
parts of funding that may have been used for F&A costs—such as 
institutional allocation of costs to the specific lab, such as a rent equivalent, 
and for phones, networks, and maintenance—as now constituting partial 
funding for other research projects that may happen to occur in the same 
lab during the same time period. In other words, labs are not supposed to 
 95. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, FAQs, supra note 82. 
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use federal funds to pay general lab F&A costs unless the lab is willing to 
allow research projects being performed in that lab space during the 
funding period to essentially be partly federally funded projects, even if the 
lab and the particular project PI did not directly seek federal funding for 
that project or consider it to be a federally funded project. 
In many lab environments this might not be a problem, because there 
may be little consequence to having non-directly funded research “tainted” 
in this way by application of funding for another project to lab F&A costs. 
But, in the context of hPSC research such indirect cost allocation can have 
dramatic effects, because a lab that wants to pursue both federally funded 
research on eligible hPSC lines and non-federally funded research on 
ineligible hPSC lines may miss the prohibition on indirect costs and wind 
up violating the terms of their federal funding agreement. Another way of 
looking at it is that by specifically prohibiting the use of federal funds not 
just for direct costs of ineligible hPSC research, but also for indirect costs 
of that research, the Bush Administration policy is arguably attempting to 
push ineligible hPSC research out of non-profit and university labs 
altogether. Ultimately, President Bush has leveraged his limited authority 
to shape the contours of federal spending on hPSC research into an 
effective tool to reduce the amount of hPSC research overall—whether 
aided by federal dollars or not—in funding dependent non-profit and 
university labs. 
This change, of course, plays right along with the bootstrapping 
method mentioned in Part I above to try to reduce the total number of 
human blastocysts (or embryos, depending upon which scientist you are 
talking to) that will be destroyed to access the hPSCs within. The 
prohibition on federal funding for hPSC lines derived from any source 
other than the Registry means that the value of newly derived hPSC lines is 
diminished because the primary source for non-profit and university life 
sciences research remains the federal government. And yet, until and unless 
Congress acts to ban the derivation of new hPSC lines from any or all 
source blastocysts/embryos, such derivation, and any subsequent research, 
on the resultant hPSC line is perfectly legitimate. Clearly, Congress itself 
exercises its “power of the purse” on many occasions to try to achieve 
policy goals indirectly that it either is not authorized to address under the 
Constitution, or that it is politically unwilling to address directly. But for a 
presidential administration that opposes social activism by the judiciary, on 
the grounds that these activities represent overreaching by the judges, the 
Bush stem cell policy seems awfully activist itself: It seeks to reach beyond 
a limited grant of discretionary power over agency spending to achieve far 
larger and consequential social policy goals, which arguably should be left 
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to Congress.96
At the same time, this attempt to reduce the number of new hPSC 
lines developed and used even outside of federally funded projects may not 
be entirely successful. Once again, the devil is in the details. A further look 
at the NIH FAQs page for stem cell research and researchers shows a 
surprising amount of minutiae devoted to this issue of cost allocation, 
considering the very basic language used to define and answer questions 
about stem cells themselves: 
Technical guidance provided by the DHHS Division of 
Cost Allocation states that the cost principles and Cost 
Accounting Standards contained in OMB Circular A-21, 
particularly with regard to the treatment of activities sponsored 
by industry and foreign governments, are equally applicable to 
unallowable stem cell research. The regulations strictly forbid 
the shifting of costs from these activities to federally sponsored 
activities. Strict adherence to the principles contained in the 
circular requires the allocation of indirect costs, also known as 
facilities and administrative (F&A) costs, to both federally 
sponsored and other activities, which would include unallowable 
stem cell research. Federal policy is clear that no federal funding 
may be used, either directly or indirectly, to support human 
embryonic stem cell research outside the criteria established by 
the President on August 9, 2001. Therefore, the direct costs of 
such unallowable activity must be charged only to non-federal 
sources of funding. With respect to indirect costs, or F&A costs, 
institutions engaged in unallowable stem cell research must 
strictly adhere to guidance contained in OMB Circular A-21. 
Strict compliance with cost allocation methodologies described 
in the circular, including the Cost Accounting Standards, will 
prevent the shifting of unallowable stem cell research costs to 
federally sponsored programs. The F&A costs, which are 
allocable to stem cell research falling outside the criteria 
established on August 9, 2001, will not be charged to federally 
sponsored activities because the direct costs of such research 
must be directly charged to non-federal sources of funding. A 
properly documented F&A proposal utilized in the establishment 
of F&A rates should demonstrate that none of the costs of 
96 Of course, a distinction can, and should, be made that the president is an elected 
official, whereas federal judges are appointed.  Thus, one could argue that the 
Executive branch, like the Legislative, is the appropriate place for social policy 
decisions to be made.  However, the Executive branch is also like the Judiciary in 
that it is supposed to be implementing the law created by the Legislative branch, 
not making that law. 
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unallowable stem cell research or other unallowable activities 
have been shifted to federally sponsored activities.97
The FAQs page then goes on to give even more specific guidance from 
OMB Circular A-21 and OMB Circular A-122: 
Accounting for unallowable costs is discussed in Circular 
A-21, Section C.12.e: 
All unallowable costs covered by subsections a through 
d shall be subject to the same cost accounting principles 
governing cost allocability as unallowable costs. In 
circumstances where these unallowable costs normally would 
be part of a regular F&A cost allocation base or bases, they 
shall remain in such base or bases. Where a directly 
associated cost is part of a category of costs normally 
included in a F&A cost pool that shall be allocated over a 
base containing the unallowable cost with which it is 
associated, such a directly associated cost shall be retained in 
the F&A cost pool and be allocated through the regular 
allocation process. 
In Circular A-122, see Section B.3 for unallowable costs and 
activities: 
The cost of certain activities are not allowable as 
charges to Federal awards (see, for example, fundraising costs 
in paragraph 17 of Attachment B). However, even though 
these costs are unallowable for purposes of computing 
charges to Federal awards, they nonetheless must be treated 
as direct costs for purposes of determining indirect cost rates 
and be allocated their share of the organization’s indirect 
costs if they represent activities which (1) include the salaries 
of personnel, (2) occupy space, and (3) benefit from the 
organization’s indirect costs.98
The final paragraph on the FAQs page may be one its most illuminating, 
however: 
Each organization that receives federal funds on NIH 
grants and contracts must have in place adequate policies, 
procedures, and internal controls to provide reasonable assurance 
that federal funds are not used to support non-federally supported 
or unallowable costs. These policies are appropriate for work on 
stem cells lines not included in the NIH Human Embryonic Stem 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (citing OMB Circular A-21 and OMB Circular A-122). 
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Cell Registry. Organizations will be well served by providing 
training to staff working with non-registered lines to reinforce 
these policies and procedures and the need to carefully document 
the assignment and allocation of costs between federally 
supported and non-federal projects.99
As all lawyers know, terms like “reasonable” can dramatically qualify 
an otherwise strict or unqualified obligation or duty. Thus, the draconian 
prohibition of federal funds for both direct and indirect costs of ineligible 
hPSC research is softened, under the NIH’s implementation, by a 
requirement only that the recipient’s policies to prevent improper use of 
federal funds “provide reasonable assurance that federal funds are not used 
to support non-federally supported or unallowable costs.”100 This 
“softening” is further enhanced by the extra language that such 
organization policies “are appropriate for work on stem cells lines not 
included in the NIH Human Embryonic Stem Cell Registry.”101
Combined with the specific language from (and hyperlinks to) the 
OMB Circulars regarding how organizations can use careful accounting to 
narrowly slice and dice cost allocation even within a lab—or even within a 
specific research project?—so that even indirect costs such as F&A can be 
divvied up among multiple projects, this final section of the FAQs page 
seems to give researchers and their organizations the play book for how to 
prevent the Bush hPSC policy from in fact squelching their ability to 
engage in non-federally funded, ineligible hPSC research right alongside 
federally funded, eligible hPSC projects. But, if so, it is quite possible that 
a patentable invention could arise from both the federally funded eligible 
hPSC work and the non-federally funded ineligible hPSC work done in a 
single lab—or for that matter, multiple labs in a larger collaborative 
research effort. 
But would this patentable invention then fall under the provisions of 
Bayh-Dole? The usual test of this is whether federal funding was at least 
partly used for the research in which the patentable invention, or now 
“subject invention” under the parlance of Bayh-Dole, was first 
conceived.102 On one level, then, only “subject inventions” conceived in the 
performance of the federally funded eligible hPSC research should lead to 
patents governed by Bayh-Dole. But researchers are not always able to say 
with precision exactly how and when a particular invention was conceived. 
This is especially true when one considers that “conceived” here is 
intended as a specific term of art in patent law. Any number of priority of 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 35 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). 
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invention battles have turned on small details evidencing a party’s claim of 
the date of conception of the idea. It will be no more clear here, in many 
cases, as to the actual date and exact circumstances of conception in 
research projects with multiple federally funded and non-federally funded 
components. The upshot of all this is that Bayh-Dole may indeed wind up 
covering patentable inventions arising only in part from federally funded 
hPSC research. 
Before turning to other sources of funding for hPSC research, it is 
worth pausing over some of the inferences and speculations made above. 
Certainly, there is a fair bit of reading tea leaves in those inferences and 
speculations, most of which are based primarily only on language from 
NIH web pages. But, I cannot help believing that these inferences are at 
least plausible, given the fact that NIH is largely staffed by serious 
scientists—most of whose non-governmental counterparts support nearly 
unfettered hPSC research—who are not direct political appointees and 
indeed will remain through the administrations of both political parties. 
Thus, a change at the top does not necessarily change the core convictions 
of the vast rank and file who must implement the latest boss’s edicts. And, 
without asserting any charges of disloyalty on this quasi-permanent 
bureaucracy, it is not unimaginable that they might exercise to the fullest 
their own discretionary authority in how to implement an executive 
directive, just as the President seems to have exercised his discretionary 
authority to decide agency spending policy to the fullest. Further evidence 
supporting this speculation is perhaps provided by the NIH’s decision to 
also include the following on the FAQs page: 
Who is responsible for setting the policy to allow federal 
money to be used for human embryonic stem cell research? 
As the head of the executive branch of the federal 
government, which includes the National Institutes of Health, the 
President of the United States has the final responsibility and 
authority to set federal government policy for funding human 
embryonic stem cell research. But Congress has appropriations 
authority and can possibly override the President’s decision.103
A reminder from within the bowels of the NIH as to the impermanence of 
presidential directives perhaps? 
2. Other Sources of Funding for hPSC Research 
Prior to the 2004 elections, the only real viable alternative to federal 
funding for hPSC research was private money. However, as mentioned in 
Part I above, a substantial portion of private funding comes in under the 
 103. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, FAQs, supra note 82. 
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guise of sponsored research. This usually means that the research will be 
effectively owned by the paying sponsor, subject to strict confidentiality 
provisions, and any resultant IP will be assigned to the sponsor. In many 
ways, then, these sorts of research projects might best be viewed as simply 
extensions of private corporate in-house research. But this will, of course, 
put virtually all of the control and ownership of the research results out of 
the public’s grasp. Further, given past trends, this source of funding—even 
coupled with philanthropic private funding—will be inadequate to fund the 
types of hPSC research needed to advanced the science to a 
commercializable stage. 
But, as also set out in Part I above, in the wake of the 2004 elections 
some major new public sources of hPSC funding have emerged. 
Proposition 71 alone will generate twenty-four times the annual spending 
on hPSC research than the NIH currently provides.104 This will be matched, 
or nearly matched, by any number of other states who are desperate to 
prevent the feared “brain drain” to California.105 Thus, state and local 
funding of hPSC should easily dwarf federal spending within a year or so. 
This good news is also the bad news though. As seen above, 
Proposition 71 is incredibly vague as to how IP rights will be allocated 
when state funded hPSC research leads to patentable results. Talk about a 
discretionary grant: the ICOC is given essentially complete discretion to 
structure IP rights allocation in funding agreements with researchers, 
including on an ad hoc basis. This means that there may be a myriad of 
different types of IP rights allocation under the various ICOC/CIRM 
funding grants. 
Further, even though Proposition 71 clearly prioritizes funding for 
hPSC research that is unlikely to receive federal funding, it does not flat 
out prohibit such funding. Thus, where the CIRM funds hPSC that NIH 
also funds, Bayh-Dole should trump any IP rights allocation that the CIRM 
negotiates for in its funding agreement. And even in cases where the CIRM 
funds the ineligible hPSC research of a particular lab, while NIH funds the 
eligible research, any resultant IP may wind up being captured as partly 
funded by NIH, and thus covered under Bayh-Dole in supremacy over 
whatever rights allocation is set out in the CIRM funding agreement. 
All of the foregoing will be even further complicated once other state 
and local governments get into the picture too. Perhaps they will do a better 
job setting firmer guidelines or rules for IP rights allocation under their 
respective funding agreements. But, what of the case where local, state, 
 104. This statistic is based on the estimates of $300 million in annual funding under 
Proposition 71 for ten years and $25 million in annual funding by the NIH. See supra 
Part I.C. and infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 105. See supra Part I. 
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federal, and private funds are used for different parts or phases along a 
long-term research project—such as often occurs in life sciences 
research—and patents arise that are nearly impossible to allocate precisely 
to one set of funding? None of this, of course, is different from the same 
sorts of ownership snafus that play out in tech transfer offices across the 
country currently. But, with the reduction of the role of federal funding, 
and dramatic increase in the role of state and local funding, even more 
confusion is likely to ensue. 
B. Adult Stem Cell Research. 
Outside of hPSC research, the situation is almost guaranteed to be 
worse. Because embryos are not involved, the Bush Administration clearly 
favors adult stem cell research. Thus, federal funds will flow much more 
readily to these sorts of projects than to hPSC projects. At the same time, 
even though some opponents of Proposition 71 claimed the opposite,106 
Proposition 71 very much allows the CIRM to fund adult stem cell 
research.107 Certainly, the law prioritizes hPSC research, but it does so only 
to the extent that the same “cannot, or is unlikely” to receive federal 
funding—if other types of stem cell research later become off limits to 
federal funding agencies such as the NIH, then the CIRM is fully able to 
prioritize funding that research too.108 Admittedly, this prioritization 
scheme is intended “to ensure that [CIRM] funding does not duplicate or 
supplant existing funding….”109 But, despite the use of the term “ensure,” 
the entire text of the prioritization clause of Proposition 71 does not seem 
to entirely preclude the possibility that CIRM funds will mix with federal 
funds in the financing of a research project. 
Furthermore, outside of this negative partial requirement regarding 
federal funding possibilities, Proposition 71 only limits CIRM funding to 
“pluripotent stem cell and progenitor cell research.”110 The term 
“pluripotent cells” is defined in Proposition 71 essentially the same way as 
the term “hPSC” has been used in this Article: 
“Pluripotent cells” means cells that are capable of self-renewal, 
and have broad potential to differentiate into multiple adult cell 
types. Pluripotent stem cells may be derived from somatic cell 
nuclear transfer or from surplus products of in vitro fertilization 
treatments when such products are donated under appropriate 
 106. See Tom McClintock et al., Argument Against Proposition 71, at 
http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/prop71-arguments.htm. 
 107. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125290.60(c)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2005). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
O'CONNOR PROOF 3 (MACRO)(SOC 031105) 3/15/2005  1:07:37 PM 
734 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:nnn 
 
informed consent procedures. These excess cells from in vitro 
fertilization treatments would otherwise be intended to be 
discarded if not utilized for medical research.111
But, “progenitor cells” are defined by Proposition 71 as “multipotent 
or precursor cells that are partially differentiated but retain the ability to 
divide and give rise to differentiated cells.”112 This clearly includes adult 
stem cells. 
Thus the key limitation for CIRM funding is that “a high priority shall 
be placed on funding” hPSC and adult stem cell research that “cannot, or is 
unlikely to,” receive adequate, timely, unencumbered federal funding. Yet, 
with $300 million to dispose of annually, the CIRM might well fully fund 
all “priority” projects and still have money to distribute. Further, a 
subsequent provision of Proposition 71 gives the CIRM the authority to not 
only fund non-priority projects, but also to fund “other scientific and 
medical research and technologies and/or any stem cell research proposal” 
not already funded by it, provided only that “two-thirds of a quorum of the 
members of the Scientific and Medical Research Funding Working Group 
recommend to the ICOC that such a research proposal is a vital research 
opportunity.”113 What constitutes a vital research opportunity? Proposition 
71 gives us the very model of an exercise in circularity: 
“Vital research opportunity” means scientific and medical 
research and technologies and/or any stem cell research not 
actually funded by [CIRM] under [the high priority clause] 
which provides a substantially superior research opportunity vital 
to advance medical science as determined by at least two-thirds 
vote of a quorum of the members of the Scientific and Medical 
Research Funding Working Group and recommended as such by 
that working group to the ICOC. Human reproductive cloning 
 111. Id. § 125292.10(q). Note that the definition is actually for “pluripotent cells” not 
“pluripotent stem cells,” or even “human pluripotent stem cells.” However, in the 
regular provisions of the law, the term “pluripotent stem cells” is used. This is likely 
simply a drafting oversight, although in theory it could have consequences. More 
interesting is the explanatory or possibly argumentative flourish provided by the last 
sentence of the definition: it is not a definition per se, such as if it said “cells … must 
otherwise be intended to be discarded.” Instead it seems to be an extra argument for 
hPSC research, such as is often employed anyway—these embryos would be 
discarded otherwise. See, e.g., Bill Press, Jesus Votes for Stem-Cell Research, 
WORLDNETDAILY, Dec. 31, 2004, at http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp? 
ARTICLE_ID=42191 (arguing that it would be better to use discarded embryos “to 
save perhaps millions of lives” than to “[t]oss them in the dumpster along with the 
coffee grinds, orange peels and empty beer bottles”). 
 112. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125292.10(r). 
 113. Id. § 125290.60(c)(1)(D). 
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shall not be a vital research opportunity.114
At least we know that “vital research opportunity” cannot include human 
reproductive cloning. 
While it is too early to know what other post-Proposition 71 state 
funding proposals will look like, there is a good chance that they will be at 
least as flexible as the California law. Further, state life sciences funding 
proposals that predate Proposition 71—such as Pennsylvania’s dedication 
of its tobacco litigation settlement money—already are directed to a wide 
variety of research. Because adult stem cell research is well established as 
the less controversial path for stem cell funding, the myriad state and local 
funding initiatives may well flow to that, even as the point of Proposition 
71 was to essentially do an end run around the Bush Administration 
funding limitation on hPSC research. 
But with the increasingly complex nature of life sciences research 
projects in general, it is not uncommon for funding and subsequent 
ownership and control issues to stretch across multiple institutions, 
researchers, and a fairly long time period. Thus, even in the area of adult 
stem cell research, where federal dollars should still flow fairly freely, 
states and local municipalities may still find themselves competing to keep 
stem cell researchers, institutes, and companies. This will likely result in 
attractive (for the recipient) financing and tax packages such as the kind 
that have pursued the dwindling manufacturing opportunities in this 
country. But a crucial card that would-be funders can play in these races to 
the bottom is the waiver of any and all IP rights that come out of the stem 
cell research. At the same time, IP revenues may well be the only viable 
recoupment or return on investment avenue open to these suitor 
governments. This may explain Proposition 71’s coyness on the subject—it 
needs to preserve the flexibility of the CIRM to negotiate with differently 
situated research entities as the background environment for such entities 
changes over time. Other states and localities may decide that their funding 
agencies need the same flexibility to wage an all-out battle for brain power 
and high employment opportunities for their locality. 
C. Two Recent High Profile Public Funding Controversies 
One argument of this Article is that the ownership and control of the 
medical breakthroughs that may arise from stem cell research have a strong 
possibility of being mired down in hopelessly conflicting IP claims. The 
case for that was made above. But another fundamental argument of the 
Article is that where revolutionary medical breakthroughs arise from stem 
cell research that was at least partly publicly funded, and the 
 114. Id. § 125292.10(y) (emphasis added). 
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commercializing entity charges exorbitant monopolistic prices for the 
resultant life saving therapies, the public will demand that the government 
step in to reduce these retail prices. In part, this is due to the recent 
publicity given to arguments in scholarly articles and the popular media 
that the public is already “paying twice” for many medications and 
therapies that arose in part from federally funded research. The resultant 
attention has focused on the need for the government to issue compulsory 
licenses or exercise march-in rights under Bayh-Dole. 
While the scholarly and factual bases for these arguments may be 
flawed, the pull they exert on a public weary of astronomical health care 
prices—excruciatingly and prohibitively so for those without adequate 
health insurance—is substantial. Thus, the following two cases that appear 
to constitute the only formal march-in rights petitions lodged since Bayh-
Dole was passed are instructive. 
1. Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, Inc.115
The first major march-in rights petition involved, appropriately 
enough, stem cell research. Dr. Curt Civin, a researcher at Johns Hopkins 
University (Hopkins), received NIH funding that led to the publication of a 
paper in 1984 on his discovery of certain antibodies that would bind to 
certain antigens appearing on hematopoietic stem cells.116 These antibodies, 
which he dubbed “anti-My-10,” could allow a technician to separate out the 
hematopoietic stem cells, because only these cells have the stage specific 
antigen “My-10” on their surface.117 The anti-My-10 monoclonal 
antibodies bind only to the My-10 antigens, and hence only to 
hematopoietic stem cells. Over time, the anti-My-10 and similar antibodies 
came to be referred to as “CD34 antibodies.” The name shift has been 
explained as arising from the practice of panels of scientists reviewing 
research data and then designating clusters of antibodies that have similar 
binding characteristics. Anti-My-10 was in a group of antibodies that was 
the thirty-fourth cluster to be designated, hence Cluster Designate 34 
(CD34).118 Accordingly, the hematopoietic stem cells’ distinctive, stage 
specific,119 antigen is referred to as the “CD34 antigen,” while the binding 
antibodies are dubbed “CD34 antibodies”120 or “anti-CD34 antibodies.”121
 115. 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 116. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Determination in the Case of Petition of CellPro, Inc., 
at http://www.nih.gov/icd/od/foia/cellpro/pdfs/foia_cellpro39.pdf (Aug. 1, 1997). 
 117. Johns Hopkins Univ., 152 F.3d at 1347. 
 118. Id. at 1350 n.13. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 116. 
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Civin and Hopkins filed patent application serial number 670,740 
(‘740 application), around this same time.122 This application led to the 
issuance of U.S. Patent No. 4,714,680 (‘680 patent), as well as divisional 
applications that led to U.S. Patent Nos. 4,965,204 (‘204 patent), 5,035,994 
(‘994 patent), and 5,130,144 (‘144 patent).123 All four of these patents 
(collectively, the Civin Patents) were the basis for a hematopoietic stem 
cell purification and suspension technology that Hopkins exclusively 
licensed to Becton-Dickinson & Co. (BD) around 1984 or 1985, although 
the first of the patents did not issue until 1987.124 “BD … market[ed] the 
first []CD34 antibody in 1985 and has sold []CD34 antibodies worldwide” 
since then.125 Because BD focused on the diagnostic applications of CD34 
antibodies, it exclusively sublicensed therapeutic application rights to 
Baxter Healthcare Corporation (Baxter); Baxter then further sublicensed its 
rights to Applied Immune Sciences (later RPR Gencell) and Systemix (later 
acquired by Novartis).126
Hopkins formally notified the NIH, as required under Bayh-Dole, on 
October 4, 1984 that it was electing to take title to the invention covered by 
the ‘680 patent. In the later march-in rights petition proceeding, NIH 
determined that it had jurisdiction over the technology as covered by the 
‘204, ‘994, and ‘144 patents as well because they all stemmed from the 
same original disclosure in the ‘740 application, which disclosure itself 
could be traced to utilization reports filed by Hopkins from the 1980s 
through the early 1990s with the NIH.127 Hopkins also sent a license to NIH 
regarding this technology, as required under Bayh-Dole.128 In sum, NIH 
argued that conception of the inventions contained in all of the Civin 
Patents occurred in Civin’s performance of a NIH funded project, and 
hence all resultant patents were subject to Bayh-Dole. This, of course, is 
exactly the sort of long range, complicated research project that frequently 
occurs in the life sciences and around which a truism of sorts has arisen in 
the university community that Bayh-Dole reaches essentially everything 
that university labs develop. 
Four years after Hopkins filed the ‘740 application, Dr. Ronald 
Berenson, a researcher at the Fred Hutchinson Research Center in Seattle 
(Hutchinson), developed a similar method for targeting and separating 
hematopoietic stem cells by means of an antigen binding monoclonal 
 122. Id. at 4 n.6. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1, 5. 
 125. Id. at 5. 
 126. Id. 
 127. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 116, at 3-4. 
 128. Id. at 4. 
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antibody that he dubbed the 12.8 antibody.129 In 1989 CellPro, Inc. 
(CellPro) was founded by Berenson, some colleagues at Hutchinson,130 and 
some venture capitalists.131 CellPro turned the 12.8 technology into the 
hematopoietic stem cell separation machines named Ceprate LC and 
Ceprate SC, began selling the units on a limited basis to clinics,132 and then 
received FDA approval to commercially market the units to the public.133
Hopkins, Baxter, and BD approached CellPro about taking a license 
for the Ceprate machines because the 12.8 technology appeared to infringe 
the Civin Patents.134 CellPro declined and instead instituted an apparently 
unsuccessful action in federal court for the Western District of Washington 
in 1992 for a declaratory judgment that it was not in fact infringing the 
Civin Patents.135 Hopkins, Baxter, and BD (Hopkins) later sued CellPro in 
1994 in federal court for the District of Delaware.136 After a complicated 
proceeding, Hopkins won a judgment on June 28, 1996 for infringement.137 
The damages phase concluded on July 24, 1997, with a finding of 
willfulness and an award for treble damages, to the tune of approximately 
$7 million.138
But after the initial infringement finding, CellPro petitioned the NIH 
to exercise march-in rights based on an argument that Hopkins et al had 
either failed to bring the Civin Patents inventions to the point of practical 
application, or that they failed to reasonably satisfy health or safety 
needs.139 Despite the scathing opinion of the district court judge that 
documented extremely bad faith behavior on the part of CellPro both inside 
and outside the courtroom—wining and dining a court deputy and flying 
her for a vacation to California, for example—the CellPro march-in rights 
petition has been used in some quarters as the shining example of a noble 
small company just trying to save lives while being repressed by an evil 
coalition of big corporations and a major university obsessed with 
enforcing patent rights.140
 129. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 130. Id. at 1348. 
 131. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D. Del. 1997). 
 132. Johns Hopkins Univ., 152 F.3d at 1348. 
 133. Johns Hopkins Univ., 978 F. Supp. at 189. 
 134. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 116. 
 135. Johns Hopkins Univ., 978 F. Supp. at 195. 
 136. Id. at 184. 
 137. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 931 F. Supp. 303, 303, 328 (D. Del. 1996). 
 138. Johns Hopkins Univ., 978 F. Supp. at 184, 193, 196. 
 139. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 116. The first argument was based on 
section 1(a) of the Bayh-Dole march-in rights, 35 U.S.C. § 203(1)(a), while the 
second was based on 35 U.S.C. § 203(1)(b). 
 140. See, e.g., CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH., CellPro and Bayh-Dole March-in Rights, at 
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Despite an enormous amount of publicity generally favoring this 
“David” against the “Goliath” of Hopkins the NIH was unimpressed and 
found that: (1) Hopkins et al. was proceeding diligently with 
commercializing the Civin patents and (2) health and safety needs were 
being filled by CellPro’s current sales of the Ceprate machines. Hopkins 
allowed it to continue selling in a limited and monitored way under a 
revised injunctive order from the patent infringement proceedings, and 
Baxter was likely to have a suitable alternative product commercially 
available shortly anyway.141 In the end, some saw this as confirmation that 
the federal government, through the NIH, will never exercise march-in 
rights.142 But perhaps the more important message is that the NIH will 
seriously consider the speed of commercialization efforts, as it should, in 
determining whether to exercise march-in rights. Had Hopkins 
demonstrated no compelling story about their diligence in commercializing, 
and had Baxter not been able to show a near ready commercial market 
substitute for CellPro’s Ceprate machines and technology, then the NIH 
may well have required Hopkins to grant a license to CellPro, or stepped in 
and granted it itself if Hopkins did not comply.143
2. Essential Inventions, Inc. and Abbott Laboratories  
If the CellPro march-in petition was a test of commercialization 
diligence, then the next formal petition, involving the patents behind 
Abbott Laboratories’ (Abbott) Norvir AIDS drug, was a test of Bayh-Dole 
and march-in rights as price or profit regulation. It is interesting to note that 
while the NIH addressed the CellPro petition as just that (“In the Case of 
Petition of CellPro, Inc.”), it did not even mention the prime movant of the 
Abbott petition by name anywhere in its official determination report. That 
report is simply titled “In the Case of Norvir Manufactured by Abbott 
Laboratories, Inc.”144 But Essential Inventions, Inc., an affiliate of the 
http://www.cptech.org/p/cellpro (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). The Consumer Project on 
Technology was created by Ralph Nader in 1995 and was the prime force behind the 
later Essential Inventions petition for march-in rights against Abbott Laboratories 
discussed below. 
 141. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 116. 
 142. See, e.g., David Halperin, The Bayh-Dole Act and March-In Rights (May 2001), 
available at http://ott.od.nih.gov/meeting/david-halperin-attorney-counselor.pdf. 
143 Of course, Hopkins had already offered a license to CellPro, for which it was 
rewarded with a declaratory judgment action.  Thus, a second question, picked up 
in the Essential Inventions petition described below, is whether a potential licensee 
can use march-in rights to obtain more favorable licensing terms that it would 
otherwise get in the marketplace from the patent owner. 
 144. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, In the Case of Norvir, Manufactured by Abbot 
Laboratories, Inc., at http://ott.od.nih.gov/Reports/March-in-norvir.pdf (July 29, 
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Consumer Project on Technology that was created by Ralph Nader, was the 
formal petitioner that requested that NIH exercise march-in rights on the 
Norvir patents based solely on a dramatic price increase by Abbott mid-
way through the patent term.145 In response, NIH solicited public comments 
and held a day of hearings on May 25, 2004.146 Essential Inventions, Inc. 
also prompted legislators such as Senator Clinton of New York to submit 
letters requesting that NIH exercise march-in rights on the Abbott 
patents.147
The crux of the Essential Inventions, Inc. arguments, as espoused by 
James Love, that organization’s leader, is that the march-in rights of Bayh-
Dole are as much about price regulation and the prevention of 
“unreasonable use” of Bayh-Dole covered patents, as about simple non-use 
or failure to commercialize the patent.148 But the origin of Love’s argument 
is actually a controversial article in the Tulane Law Review by Professors 
Arno and Davis entitled Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price 
Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing 
Requirements Imposed upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from 
Federally Funded Research.149 This piece purports to exhaustively research 
the legislative history of Bayh-Dole, only to “discover” that the law’s 
drafters wisely incorporated price control provisions—through the march-
in rights provisions—that somehow the entire tech transfer community 
forgot about or never realized were in there. The authors then followed the 
article up with an op-ed in the Washington Post entitled Paying Twice for 
the Same Drugs150 that successfully brought their arguments to a wider 
audience. 
That broader audience included Senators Birch Bayh and Bob Dole, 
who were incensed by what they saw as an attempt to “rewrite history.”151 
They quickly responded with their own piece in the Washington Post 
2004). 
 145. ESSENTIAL INVENTIONS, INC., Petition to use Authority Under Bayh-Dole Act to 
Promote Access to Ritonavir, Supported by National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases Contract No. AI27220, at http://www.essentialinventions.org/ 
legal/norvir/norvir-29Jan04petition.pdf (Jan. 29, 2004). 
 146. Notice of Public Meeting, 69 Fed. Reg. 23,210 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
 147. Letter from Eight U.S. Senators, to Elias A. Zerhouni, Director, National Institutes of 
Health (May 11, 2004), available at http://www.essentialinventions.org/ 
legal/norvir/8senators2nih.pdf.. 
 148. ESSENTIAL INVENTIONS, INC., supra note 145. 
 149. Id.; see also Arno & Davis, supra note 80. 
 150. Peter S. Arno & Michael Davis, Paying Twice for the Same Drugs, WASH. POST, Mar. 
27, 2002, at A21. 
 151. Statement of Senator Birch Bayh to the National Institutes of Health (May 25, 2004), 
available at http://ott.od.nih.gov/meeting/senator-birch-bayh.pdf. 
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directly contradicting Arno and Davis’ claims as to the former’s intentions 
in sponsoring Bayh-Dole.152 Senator Bayh later described the series of 
events—and the mistakes at the root of them—in his testimony at the NIH 
march-in hearings for Abbott’s Norvir patents (where he was confronted by 
more of the same revisionist history): 
It was first brought to my attention that attempts were 
underway to rewrite history when I saw an article in the 
Washington Post on March 27, 2002, entitled Paying Twice for 
the Same Drugs. The crux of the article was that: 
Bayh-Dole … states that practically any new drug invented 
wholly or in part with federal funds will be made available to 
the public at a reasonable price. If it is not, then the 
government can insist that the drug be licensed to more 
reasonable manufacturers, and if refused, license it to third 
parties that will make the drug available at a reasonable cost. 
This view mistakes how our law works. Bob Dole and I 
responded in a letter to the editor of the Washington Post on 
April 11, 2002 setting the record straight. 
You can imagine my surprise when I see the same 
arguments were being formally presented in a petition to NIH 
in an attempt to control drug prices. The quotations in the 
petition flagrantly misrepresent the legislative history 
supporting Bayh-Dole. The petition shows complete lack of 
understanding of how the legislative process works. The 
current petition says: “The clear language of the Bayh-Dole 
act requires reasonable pricing of government supported 
inventions.” It later adds: “The legislative history evidences 
an intent to require that government supported inventions be 
priced reasonably.” 
All but one of the citations in the petition used to 
conclude that march-in rights were intended to control prices 
actually refer to hearings on bills other than Bayh-Dole. 
While perhaps interesting, these are not pertinent legislative 
history.153
Senator Bayh is correct. Computerized legal research tools such as 
LEXIS generate a long and broad list of “legislative history” for Bayh-
Dole, but do not clearly delineate that much of the list’s contents are either 
much earlier bills that were never passed, or competing bills in the 
 152. Birch Bayh & Robert Dole, Our Law Helps Patients Get New Drugs Sooner, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 11, 2002, at A28. 
 153. Senator Birch Bayh, supra note 151. 
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Congress at the same time as Bayh-Dole.154 Professor Rebecca Eisenberg 
accurately documents a bit of this history in an article in the Virginia Law 
Review when she contrasts the proposed tech transfer bill submitted to 
Congress by the Carter Administration with that of Senators Birch Bayh 
and Bob Dole.155 Interestingly, Arno and Davis cite some of the early parts 
of Professor Eisenberg’s article, but then ignore the bulk of it that clearly 
undercuts many of their historical arguments. 
Senator Bayh further documents examples in which the Essential 
Inventions, Inc. petition, again based on the Arno and Davis article, 
actually takes snippets of statements being made in testimony for entirely 
different bills and then splices them together, with the claim that such 
statements were made at the hearings for Bayh-Dole itself.156 It is hard to 
deny Senator Bayh’s claims—particularly if you look to the legislative 
history that he cites—and yet, if true, these are very disturbing allegations. 
Additional support for Senator Bayh’s statements as to the true intent and 
meaning of his own bill is given by direct testimony from Norman Latker, 
one of the actual drafters of Bayh-Dole,157 and indirect endorsement of the 
Bayh/Dole/Latker position by Howard Bremer, another key player in the 
development of Bayh-Dole, through the statement submitted by Mr. 
Bremer’s longtime employer, the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation 
(WARF).158
In the end, while few people are pleased with Abbott’s decision to 
dramatically increase the price of Norvir, the NIH was persuaded that 
Abbott has indeed fulfilled its commercialization requirements under Bayh-
Dole and so an exercise of march-in rights is not warranted.159 But, as 
Bayh-Dole supporters such as Norman Latker point out, there are other 
avenues, such as antitrust law, that should be, and are being, pursued with 
relation to Abbott’s actions in the marketplace.160 What is instructive, 
however, is how far Essential Inventions, Inc. was able to take its 
campaign, including the successful corralling of influential legislators such 
 154. See Sean M. O’Connor, The Evolution of Government Research Patent Policy: 
Putting Bayh-Dole into the Proper Context (working paper on file with author). 
 155. Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 1695-96. 
 156. Statement of Senator Birch Bayh, supra note 151. 
 157. See Statement of Norman J. Latker, Before NIH On Essential Inventions Petition 
Regarding Norvir, National Institutes of Health, Hearings on Ritonavir (May 25, 
2004), at http://www.ott.od.nih.gov/meeting/norman-J-latker.pdf. 
 158. See Letter from Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Director, Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation, to Dr. Mark Rohrbaugh, Director of the Office of Technology 
Transfer, Office of Intramural Research, National Institutes of Health (April 15, 
2004), at http://ott.od.nih.gov/meeting/carl-e-gulbrandsen.pdf. 
 159. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 144. 
 160. See Statement of Norman J. Latker, supra note 157. 
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as Senator Clinton who may not really have understood what was going on. 
But when positioned as a battle between a greedy corporation and a 
charitable non-profit simply trying to look out for indigent individuals who 
are dying from AIDS, the issue seems to become quite clear cut for those 
who want to show that they are fighting for the little guy and against Big 
Pharma. 
D. The Need for a Comprehensive Framework for IP Rights 
Allocation in Stem Cell Funding Agreements. 
The foregoing sections amply demonstrate the conflicting ownership 
and control issues involved when valuable research results arise from 
projects with multiple funding sources. No less important today than the 
claims of the normally recognized parties – the research institution, 
government funding agency, and commercializing entity – is the newly 
empowered claim of the public itself to free or sharply discounted access to 
final commercialized products that trace their IP lineage back to publicly 
funded research. The question now is how to allocate the IP rights in 
relation to those claims. 
One way not to do it is through ex post negotiations, agency 
proceedings, or litigation. These methods are unpredictable, expensive, 
time consuming and, worst of all, often deeply unsatisfying for the parties 
involved. Instead, funding parties, researchers, and their institutions need to 
begin—or strengthen as appropriate—efforts to carefully allocate IP rights 
in advance of the funding and performance of any research. Further, the 
tradition of largely relying on the framework of Bayh-Dole may prove less 
effective, and perhaps be downright dangerous, in the new world of hPSC 
research that will likely derive the majority of its funding from non-federal 
sources. 
But this suggests a partial solution: state and local initiatives like 
Proposition 71 should explicitly incorporate the Bayh-Dole rights 
allocation framework, including inter-governmental coordinating 
mechanisms for patents arising from research that relied on combinations 
of federal, state, and local funding.  Of course, this would remove the 
ability of state and local governments to directly recoup their funding 
“investments” through royalty streams, such as California is apparently 
relying on.  But I am skeptical as to how much California should be 
counting on these revenue streams under the actual Proposition 71 anyway.  
The foregoing proposal also does nothing to remove potential conflicts 
over IP rights with private funding arrangements. However, the provisions 
of Bayh-Dole already seem to contemplate their supremacy over private 
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arrangements.161  State and local funding legislation could take a similar 
tack.  This could have the potential to chill private funding, but, at the same 
time, the existence of Bayh-Dole itself does not seem to have had a 
substantial negative impact on such funding. 
Finally, a central premise of this Article is that the problems sketched 
in the foregoing sections will be exacerbated proportional to the urgency 
and vitality of the hPSC therapy that results from any research program. 
Given the astounding claims for hPSC work, one can expect astounding 
conflicts and claims for any such research that actually bears fruit. But at 
the same time, contractual agreements that are put into place, and settled 
expectations of both the research and investment communities, need to be 
respected so as not to create an upheaval that might destroy the highly 
productive pipeline of American life sciences innovation. Thus, the final 
Part of this Article will suggest that federal and state governments should 
defer to such contractual IP rights allocation, provided that it complies with 
the inter-governmental framework proposed above, unless a compelling 
public health crisis threatens the general population. 
IV.  REQUIRING A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS TO TRIGGER GOVERNMENT 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPRIETARY THERAPIES 
As outlined above, and discussed in more detail in another paper of 
mine, the notion that Bayh-Dole establishes a pricing or profit regulation 
mechanism is simply false. Thus, in the normal course of events, the 
marketplace should be allowed to take care of the exact commercialization, 
distribution and pricing mechanisms for life sciences products, including 
hPSC derived therapies. But what about broad public health crises that 
affect the general population? For example, what if anthrax or other 
bioterror attacks were unleashed again in the United States, but this time on 
a wider scale? 
Clearly, many citizens would quickly look to the government to 
supply the necessary vaccines or antidotes, or at least guarantee that such 
medicines were made available. But would this require the exercise of 
march-in rights or a straightforward, but totally disfavored, compulsory 
license? Actually, it would not necessarily require any of these. Instead, the 
federal and state governments already have some de facto compulsory 
license powers available to them, even without relying on Bayh-Dole 
march-in rights. 
First, where any part of the invention that led to the vaccine or 
161 For example, any patent arising from a (partially) federally funded subject 
invention must contain “a statement specifying that the invention was made with 
Government support and that the Government has certain rights in the invention.”  
35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(6). 
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antidote was federally funded, the government has a non-exclusive license 
to practice, or have practiced on its behalf, the technology for government 
purposes.162 This is not a march-in right, because it is not about granting a 
license to a private contractor/licensee’s competitor to compete with the 
contractor/licensee in the marketplace. Thus, it is not like taking a pioneer 
drug that is still on patent and suddenly licensing generic drug 
manufacturers to take a competing generic version to market. Instead, the 
government non-exclusive license under Bayh-Dole simply means that if 
the government needs to provide the product developed under the patented 
technology to government employees or presumably even the public as a 
government service, then it can do so with no further notice to, or requests 
on, the patent owner. 
Second, the federal government has long had an ability to authorize 
private contractors to practice patented technology owned by other private 
parties, so long as such use is on behalf of the government as it provides 
government services.163 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a): 
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of 
the United States is used or manufactured by or for the United 
States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use 
or manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by action 
against the United States in the United States Court of Federal 
Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire 
compensation for such use and manufacture.164
This clause originated from the early twentieth century when the 
federal government was facing a shortage of private sector military 
contractors because they feared being sued by other patent owners for work 
done even under military contracts.165 Essentially, this provision removed 
that potential liability—even though contractors may still be required to 
raise it as an affirmative defense in patent infringement litigation.166 In this 
way, it does not completely remove the burden from the contractor of 
 162. See supra Part II. 
 163. See Carly M.M. Chan, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) as an Affirmative Defense to Patent 
Infringement by Universities: Why Duke v. Madey May Be a University Researcher’s 
Best Friend (working paper on file with author); DONALD S. CHISUM, 5 CHISUM ON 
PATENTS § 16.03[3][f] (2004).  Of course, the government can practice any patented 
technology directly under an eminent domain theory.  See Crozier v. Fried. Krupp 
Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 308 (1912).  But it may not be in the position to 
manufacture and distribute a good or service normally provided by the private sector.  
Thus, it will need to authorize private sector entities to perform these functions under 
contract on behalf of the government. 
 164. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). 
 165. See Chan, supra note 163. 
 166. Id. 
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threatened or filed infringement suits. But the practice of issuing so-called 
“authorization or consent” letters or other documentation to contractors has 
its roots in the definition of “use or manufacture [by or] for the United 
States”: 
For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of 
an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United 
States by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or 
corporation for the Government and with the authorization or 
consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or 
manufacture for the United States.167
Essentially, § 1498(a) is a type of formalized takings provision. The 
federal government can exercise its power of eminent domain to take a 
license for government purposes where none was granted. But, again, like 
the mandatory nonexclusive license that encumbers Bayh-Dole governed 
patents, the government may only authorize use by or on its behalf—in 
other words, for use of the patented good or service in the government’s 
performance of its governmental functions. 
The original focus of this provision, as mentioned above, was to 
facilitate the government’s core function of national defense.  But the 
clause does not seem to be limited solely to military related patent 
infringements.  Rather, the test seems to be whether the use is in “work of 
vital importance to the government.”168  Such work has included federally 
funded university basic science research, albeit where such work was still 
of “special interest to the United States Navy.”169  Nonetheless, major 
treatises and casebooks on patent law appear to treat the clause as operating 
generally, and not as restricted to military functions of the government.170
Third, state governments enjoy sovereign immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment, which has been claimed to extend to state immunity 
from patent infringement suits.171 In 1992, Congress attempted to abrogate 
this right through the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy 
Clarification Act, but the Supreme Court ultimately found this law 
unconstitutional.172 There have been other bills introduced to reduce state 
immunity from patent infringement, including one that would have 
required states to waive such immunity before pursuing their own patent 
 167. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). 
168 John J. McMullen Associates, Inc. v. State Board of Higher Education, 406 
F.2d 497, 498 (9th Cir., 1969), cert. denied, 89 S.Ct. 2016 (1969). 
169 Id. 
170 See, e.g., CHISUM, supra Note 166. 
 171. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 635, 647 (1999). 
 172. See id. at 627. 
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infringement claims against any private party. But to date, no such 
legislation has been successful. Accordingly, states are relatively free to 
practice the patented technology of private parties for state purposes. It is 
less clear whether they have anything like the authorization and consent 
power of the federal government under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). 
The common thread in all three of these scenarios is that the particular 
government entity has to provide the patented goods or services as a public 
service or benefit. Accordingly, without exercising march-in rights under 
Bayh-Dole—and thus being limited to federally-funded inventions in the 
first place—the federal government may not authorize a new competitor in 
the commercial marketplace vis á vis forcibly granting license rights. State 
governments appear to be similarly restricted. Further, at present, even the 
exercise of march-in rights is seen as a draconian measure with uncertain 
market ramifications. Thus, it may continue to be limited to its in terrorem 
power. But, if the governmental entity instead views the infringement of 
private patent rights as a necessary component in its performance of 
governmental functions, then different immediately-actionable avenues 
open up. 
So what justifies a governmental entity to provide a good or service 
that is—or can be—supplied by the private sector? One test would be that 
the work is of “vital importance to the government” at described above. 
But, this may be a more restrictive test than is required for purposes of the 
Bayh-Dole non-exclusive government license or state sovereign immunity.  
However, even if we used the more stringent “vital importance” test, then 
one could imagine various scenarios that might satisfy it.  For example, 
federal or state public health officials could determine that it is vitally 
important to the government that crucial threshold health services be 
provided by the government at low or no cost to low-income or 
impoverished citizens.  It could also mean that it is of vital importance to 
the government to confront a widespread health crisis or epidemic in a 
comprehensive and rapid manner.  
In contrast, the Abbott march-in rights petition was based largely on 
price; however the remedy available under the exercise of march-in rights 
would not have been government provision of Norvir at low or no cost, but 
rather simply a license to another private sector entity, “upon terms that are 
reasonable under the circumstances”,173 so that the latter could then bring 
the Norvir to market.  Some evidence was then brought to bear that a 
competitor acting under a march-in rights compulsory license would 
provide Norvir to the market at a cheaper price; and certainly our 
experience with generic drug manufacturers tells us that enabling 
competing, nonproprietary players will keep prices down. But will the 
173 35 U.S.C. § 203(1). 
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prices decrease enough to really address the problems of, say, indigent 
AIDS victims without health insurance, who may not be able to pay much 
if anything for medications? One could argue that we are just trying to get 
the price down low enough so that some patients could afford it, while the 
rest would hopefully be supplied by non-profits or foundations that could 
afford to cover the reduced-cost medicines. 
 But why not instead avoid all of the uncertainties of a march-in 
process, not the least of which is that, again, it does not appear that march-
in rights can be exercised simply for price control reasons. Rather, if the 
public health need is of vital importance to the government, as it may well 
be in the AIDS context, then federal and state governments could provide 
the medicines as a public health service. Further, the more dire the public 
health threat, measured either by the intensity of victims’ suffering, the 
breadth across the general population such as a pandemic, or the degree to 
which the therapy is crucial or life saving, such as is predicted for hPSC 
therapies, then the easier it is to make the argument that it is of vital 
importance to the government to provide these services. 
Would the “vital importance” test be subject to abuse, such that any 
number of patent infringing activities be authorized by the government 
even to the extent of undermining the effectiveness of the patent system?  
Possibly, but there are other limiting factors that would balance any liberal 
trend in this regard.  First, under the authorization and consent government 
services model, the government is restricted by both its own limited 
manufacturing and distribution capabilities as well as its ability to pay 
private contractors to perform these services on its behalf.  In other words, 
just because the government may be able to have the patent practiced for 
“free”174, it must still pay the substantial manufacturing and distribution 
costs to deliver the services.  Second, state governments would have similar 
limitations, even under sovereign immunity patent infringement powers.  
Third, any drastic expansion of government services at either the federal or 
state level will require political authorization that may be hard to come by.  
In conclusion, the current patchwork, hit-or-miss IP rights allocation 
system in stem cell research will lead to a nightmare of litigation 
proportional to the very success of the most ambitious projections for stem 
cell therapies. Further, until a future presidential administration relaxes the 
current limitations on federal funding of hPSC research, the stem cell 
therapy environment will suffer a reduced ability of the standard Bayh-
Dole IP rights allocation framework to govern, as it will formally apply to a 
smaller subset of patents arising in the field.  At the same time, non-
174 This may be a mischaracterization because at least for the federal government 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 it may be liable to pay reasonable royalties for it 
unauthorized “taking” of the patent license. 
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traditional funding and IP rights allocation systems, such as Proposition 71 
may come to dominate the field, creating a tangle of ownership claims. 
Thus, the first step is to demand that any state or local stem cell 
funding legislation approximate the model of the inter-governmental 
coordination framework sketched in Part III(D) above. The second step is 
to largely abandon the notion that the solution to the severe lack of 
availability or access problems lies in march-in rights, or any corollary that 
might be created in state or local funding agreements. Instead, the Bayh-
Dole type mandatory non-exclusive license for government use 
incorporated in the inter-governmental coordination framework legislation 
would be the primary vehicle for government provision of patent infringing 
services.  However, where such legislation is not forthcoming, then an 
alternative proposal is for state and local funding entities to incorporate 
analogous provisions directly into any and all stem cell funding 
agreements.  Essentially, this would call on state and local government 
agencies to self-regulate their funding activities such that an inter-
governmental coordination framework could still be substantially achieved. 
Two provisions would then be added under either alternative. First, 
guidelines would be created as to what constitutes work or services of 
“vital importance” to the relevant government in which proprietary stem 
cell therapy could or should be provided directly to the public as a 
government health service. Creating such guidelines would also have the 
virtue of preventing the destruction of the private sector life sciences 
innovation market, as it would act as a limiter or governor on the otherwise 
unchecked temptation to commandeer all valuable proprietary life sciences 
research. Second, a recoupment clause, such as was originally included in 
Bayh-Dole before being dropped prior to final enactment, would be 
required. This clause would operate as a minimal royalty, payable on 
revenues (or perhaps only profits) only until the governmental entity had 
recouped its original funding investment. It could possibly include an 
interest component such that even the most concerned citizen could be 
comfortable that no one would receive a free ride. 
If all of these could be accomplished in a coordinated framework, the 
result would be a system largely free of the specter that the public is 
“paying twice” for publicly-funded inventions, even while greater certainty 
for all market participants would be achieved. These two benefits would 
lead to further benefits. The former could lead to even greater public 
financing of research projects because the taxpaying public could more 
clearly see where its money is going and how it will be returned. The latter 
benefit should lead to increased private sector investment, both because the 
primary concern of having to give a license to your arch competitor, as 
under Bayh-Dole march-in rights, would be largely eliminated, and because 
greater certainty in the investment environment almost always draws more 
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investment because the risks are more easily calculated. Hopefully, we 
could then get back to the truly important mission at hand—creating an 
environment in which the miracles latent in stem cell research can be 
realized for the benefit of humankind. 
 
